Алара Калама и Уддака Рамапутта

[Zom]

Ашвагхоша мог изложить достижение пребываний вне форм в традиционном буддийском варианте. Как оно в суттах излагается, так и он изложил.

Да, быть может.

Джханы относят к читта-висуддхи, очищению ума. Поэтому предварительное достижение джхан видимо делает практику состояний вне форм проще. Как сказано в сутте о плодах отшельничества: "Так с сосредоточенной мыслью – чистой, возвышенной, незапятнанной, лишенной нечистоты, гибкой, готовой к действию, стойкой, непоколебимой, – он направляет и вращает мысль к совершенному видению."
Но тем не менее, это не означает, что нельзя направить ум на  "восприятие основы бесконечного пространства" без предварительного прохождения 4 джхан.

Аджан Брам считает, что Алара Калама и Удакка Рамапутта учили "не тем" бесформенным достижениям. В сутте, где описывается, Будда произносит (по крайней мере в агл. варианте), что они утверждали, что это эти состояния. Сам Будда нигде не подверждает, что эти состояния и подлинные основы ничто и не-восприятия (о которых он говорит в суттах) аналогичны.

[Ассаджи]

У меня на этот счет такое предположение, не настаиваю, что оно правильное. Я думаю, что поскольку поэма - не просто художественное или историческое произведение, а по сути - дидактическое, т.е. буддийский текст, подобно шастрам, джатакам и др., в поэтической форме, то Ашвагхоша мог изложить достижение пребываний вне форм в традиционном буддийском варианте. Как оно в суттах излагается, так и он изложил.

Ашвагхоша прекрасный поэт. Я прочитал его произведение "Саундара-нанда", написанное по мотивам текстов о двоюродном брате Готамы Нанде
http://dhamma.ru/canon/ud3-2.htm
Красиво пишет о практике, но практиковать по его произведению я не рекомендовал бы. Как раз с его произведений и началось превращение понятий практики в красивые метафизические недосягаемые конструкции.

А Алара Калама, как я предполагаю, мог учить вхождению в состояния вне форм без предварительного освоения четырех джхан.

Я тут с Вами полностью согласен.

[Сергей О.]

В сутте, где описывается, Будда произносит (по крайней мере в агл. варианте), что они утверждали, что это эти состояния. Сам Будда нигде не подверждает, что эти состояния и подлинные основы ничто и не-восприятия (о которых он говорит в суттах) аналогичны.

Маха-саччака сутта (МН 36)
Аларе Каламе бодхисатта задал вопрос, что же именно он постиг, осуществил, достиг, пребывает в этом и объявляет. Алара Калама объявил сферу "ничего нет".
Прочитав перевод и посмотрев текст на пали (и вспоминая более подробную Буддачариту), я бы скорее сказал, что здесь речь идет не о том, что Алара Калама утверждал, что достиг сферы "ничего нет", а о том, что он постиг, осуществил, достиг и т.д. (см. выше) этой сферы и объявлял её как конечную цель пути, который он проповедовал.

Вот это-то и есть Высшее Брахмо (Абсолют) —
Лишенное признаков, вечное, неизменное.
Мудрые мужи — знатоки подлинной реальности — величают
[Такое состояние сознания] полным освобождением.
Теперь мною разъяснены Тебе
Духовные средства и к окончательному освобождению.
Если это понято и принято Тобой,
То должно быть применено практически»."

(Буддачарита, см. сообщение Plastilinus)

Кроме того, в сутте есть не только слова Алары Каламы. После ученичества у него бодхисатта решил: 'This Dhamma leads not to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to stilling, to direct knowledge, to Awakening, nor to Unbinding, but only to reappearance in the dimension of nothingness.'
"Эта дхамма не ведет к разочарованию (в мирском), к бесстрастию, к прекращению, к упокоению, к постижению, к пробуждению, к ниббане, но ведет только к перерождению в сфере "ничего нет"."

Это уже слова не Алары Каламы, а вывод бодхисатты.


Аналогично - с ученичеством у Уддаки Рамапутты и сферой ни восприятия ни невосприятия.

[Ассаджи]

Early Sāṃkhya in the Buddhacarita
Kent, Stephen A.
Philosophy East and West
Vol.32:3(July 1982)
P.259-278
The University of Hawaii Press
(C) by University of Hawaii Press

http://ccbs.ntu.edu.tw/FULLTEXT/JR-PHIL/kent.htm

INTRODUCTION

In  the  twelfth  canto  of the  Buddhacarita  (B)(1) Aśvaghoṣa describes the sage Arāḍa's metaphysical system, (2) and  provides  statements concerning the liberating  knowledge that people achieve by working through it.  Arāḍa's metaphysical  system consists of twenty-five  principles, the highest  of which is distinct  from  the  others.   Liberating  knowledge involves   the  highest  principle   "knowing"   its separation  from  the  other  consituents,  and  the technique  by which the highest  principle  realizes this knowledge  is the cultivation  of the powers of discrimination.

Arāḍa's   metaphysical   system   bears   striking resemblances  to systems  that appear in other texts from roughly the same era. For instance, it has such close affinities  with metaphysical  systems in Book Twelve of the Mahābhārata(Mbh) , the Mokṣadharma, (3) that  the translator  of the  Buddhacarita, E.H. Johnston,  suspects   both  works   have   a  common authority,  possibly  a  text  of  the  little-known Varṣagaṇya school.(4)Additional similarities exist in certain  passages  of the Bhagavadgītā(Bvg),(5) but the difficulties  over  dating  the latter  text make  the  question  of influence  between  the  two impossible  to  answer  with  certainty.(6)  Another similar metaphysical  description  is elaborated  in the Indian medical text from the first century c.e., the  Caraka  Saṃhitā(CS) , (7) and  various resemblances between Arāḍa's reputed system, as well as several differences, readily can be identified.  ( 8 ) Finally, several Upaniṣads(U), especially the Katha Upaniṣad and the śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad, contain descriptions  of metaphysical  systems that resemble Arāḍa's.(9)

  Arāḍa's  system, along  with  the  systems  that resemble  it, often  are  referred  to as  forms  of "early Sāṃkhya," (10) and therefore  a prelude  to īśvarakṛṣṇa's classical Sāṃkhya(11) system of about  the  fifth  century   C.E.(12)  Johnston, for instance, speaks in this manner.  Franklin Edgerton, in  contrast,  argues  that  these  so-called  early Sāṃkhya systems within the Bhagavadgītā  and the Mahābhārata   are  but  aspects   of  "Upaniṣadic Brahmanism," and  do not  represent  doctrines  of a distinctive   school   of  thought.(13)  His   view, however, cannot explain all relevant passages in the Mahābhārata, and therefore  we must assume that an independent  tradition  of nontheism  was developing during  this  era, and that it occasionally  reveals itself  in  the  texts.(14) Nonetheless,  Edgerton's argument   has  merit   when  we  apply  it  to  the Buddhacarita -- the metaphysics of the twelfth canto "are  set  in a framework  which  espouses  the  old Upaniṣadic  notions of ātman and brahman." (15) So it is in the Buddhacarita  that Arāḍa  follows his description  of the  path  of knowledge  (sāṃkhya, although  he does  not use the term  itself) with  a description of "another method  [of]  the  same  dharma,"  that  is,  yogic trances.  The two descriptions  do not disagree over metaphysic, just method.(16) to refer, therefore, to the  metaphysics   of  the  twelfth   canto  of  the Buddhacarita  as "early  Sāṃkhya"  is not to imply that Arāḍa's  reputed  system was among those that were  beginning  to  distinguish   themselves   from orthodoxy.  Our use of the term will  be a heuristic one,(17) used to facilitate our efforts in examining the  metaphysics   of  the  tewlfth  canto  by  both comparing  them  to the  later  classical  Sāṃkhya system, and by contrasting  them  with  the Buddhist criticisms  that Aśvaghoṣa  levels  throgh Gautama (as the Bodhisattva  and the Buddha).  When helpful, references  will be made to appropriate  sections of Aśvaghoṣa's   story  of  Nanda's  conversion,  the Saundarananda  (S),(18) as well as to passages  from the    Mahābhārata,   the    Bhagavadgītā,   the Yoga-Sūtras (YS) (19) and the Upaniṣads.

AŚVAGHOṢA'S RENDITION OF ARĀḌA'S SĀṂKHYA SYSTEM

Within  verses  17-42  of the twelfth  canto  of the Buddhacarita, Aśvaghoṣa  presents Arāḍa's  early Sāṃkhya  system, and in verses  69-82  offers  the bodhisattva's  subsequent  rejection  of  it.(Verses 43-63 present a means to salvation  through  trances [dhyāna-s]  that  actually  have a closer  affinity with Buddhist yogic states than with orthodox Indian ones, and  verses  66-67  state  the  names  of  the previous great sages of what Arāḍa considers to be the joint Sāṃkhya-yoga tradition.)(20)

  Arāḍa's system consists of twenty-five principles (tattva-s) in which a distinction exists between one tattva, Ātman(21)  or   knower   of   the   field (kṣetrajnna),(22) and  the  other  twenty-four.  The twenty-four are further divided into two groups: one group of eight called  prakṛti(primary  matter) and another  group of sixteen  derived  from the former, called vikāra (secondary matter or "production"  or "derivative"  [B xii 17-20]).  Prakṛti consists  of avyakta   (unseen   power),  buddhi   (intellect), ahaṃkāra  (ego), and the five bhūta-s (elements). Vikāra consists  of the five objects of the senses, the five senses, the hands  and feet, the voice, the organs  of  generation   and  excretion,  and  manas (mind).  The  exact  process  by  which  either  the eightfold  prakṛti  generates  itself  or  prakṛti generates  the sixteen secondary  evolutes  is never explained in this text.(23)

  Together these twenty-four  tattva-s  comprise the field (kṣetra). Matter, both primary and secondary, is called "the  seen"  and  is "that  which  is born, grows old, suffers  from disease  and dies." Ātman, in contrast, is described as possessing the opposite of  these  attributes  (B  xii, 22).(24) The  Ātman continues  to transmigrate  until  it  discriminates between   itself   (the   unseen,  intelligent,  and unmanifest) and "the seen"  (the  unintelligent  and the  manifest  [B  xii, 29, 40-41]).  A  dualism  is present here between the knower of the field and the field  itself, and this  dualism  is to become  more clearly pronounced in the classical school(SK XIX).

SVABHĀVA--(INHERENT) NATURE UNDERLYING THE EIGHTFOLD PRAKṚTI

A multifeatured  unity known as svabhāva  underlies the  eightfold  prakṛti  and serves  as its  motive force for creation. Its features are identified in B xviii, 29-41 as part of a series of arguments in which the Buddha is refuting  the theory that Nature  (svabhāva)(25) is the  Creator  of the  universe.  In these  verses svabhāva  is described  as single essence (31), all pervading   (32) ,   without   attribute   (34)   or characteristics  (35), a perpetual  cause (that  is, eternal  [35]),  productive  (36), not  perceptible, unmanifest (39) and inanimate,and without consciousness (acetana?[40]).(26)

The crucial  arguments  offered  to refute svabhāva center around "the rule that attributes of an effect must  also be in the cause".  Aśvaghoṣa  (via  the Buddha) objects to the early Sāṃkhya svabhāva  on the  grounds  that  since  it  is without  attribute (guṇa[34]) or characteristics  (viśeṣa) it cannot be  the  cause  of  the  world  (or  universe) whose physical constructions are pervaded by both.(27)

  We find the same features used to  describe svabhāva in the Buddhacarita also being assigned to avyakta,  the  ummanifest, in  SKX  --  XI.(28) of  the classical school, with but one important difference. The avyakta  of the classical  scheme  contains  the three  guṇa-s  and through  them it possesses  both attributes  and  characteristics. It thereby differs from the early svabhāva, which has neither. Because of  the  guṇa-s,  Aśvaghoṣa's   criticism  of  an (inherent) nature  in  Sāṃkhya  as  being  without attribute(s) or characteristics and therefore unable to be the cause of a material world full of both, is effectively  countered  in the classical  system (SK XII -- XIII).(29) In fact  SK XIV specifically  says "the  unmanifest  (avyakta) is likewise  established because  of the  guṇa-nature  in the  cause  of the effect (or because the effect has the same qualities as the cause)." This theory  of guṇa production  in classical Sāṃkhya may have been influenced  by the early  notions  of  the  inherent  productivity   of svabhāva  (as  we are  about  to explain).  (30) In addition, the eightfold  prakṛti in early Sāṃkhya may  have evolved into the classical system's vertical  emanation pattern, involving  the karmendriya-s (five organs  of action), the buddhīndriya-s  (five senses), manas (mind), and the tanmātra-s (the five subtle  elements).  (31) In any case, before  we can reconstruct the process by which the features of the early Sāṃkhya svabhāva  become attributed  to the avyakta of classical  Sāṃkhya, we must unravel the complicated  development  of the  guṇa-s.  It is to this task that we now turn.

THE EARLY AVYAKTA (UNSEEN FORCE) AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE GUṆA-S

Nowhere  in Aśvaghoṣa's  description  of Arāḍa's Sāṃkhya  system  are the three guṇa-s  mentioned, despite  the fact that Aśvaghoṣa  knows of them (B vii  53, and n.) and  even  refutes  them  at B xxvi 10-14.  There seem to be several  reasons  for their omission.  To  begin, the  variety  of  descriptions attached    to   the   term   guṇa-s   within   the Mahābhārata  verses  of early Sāṃkhya  indicates that  their  meaning  is  in a state  of flux.  (32) Aśvaghoṣa, however, seems  to use  them  in a form different still from those of the epic, since to him they seem to signify  " the three bhāva-s"  (states of being) closely identified  with moral attributes. (33) It was these three bhāva-s in the capacity  as moral attributes  within  avyakta, the unseen force, that determine for the latter the means or mechanism by which the individual is bound to saṃsāra.  Because  the guṇa-s only are a facilitationg   force  to  avyakta,  E. H. Johnston believes  that Aśvaghoṣa  feels no need to mention them in Arāḍa's Sāṃkhya description. (34)

THE THREE EARLY SĀṂKHYA GUṆA-S AND THE BUDDHIST ROOTS OF GOOD AND EVIL

The  guṇa  development  within  Brahmanism  closely parallels the development of the Buddhist notions of the three roots of goods (kuśalamūla) (35) and the roots  of evil (akuśalamūla), (36) and Aśvaghoṣa may take advantage  of this  correspondence.  We see their   parallelism,   as   does   Aśvaghoṣa,   by associating  the three  roots of good with the guṇa sattva  and the three roots of evil with the guṇa-s rajas and tamas.  (37) Through  this association  we can understand more fully the processes of salvation in the  appropriate  developmental  stages  of  both Buddhism and early Sāṃkhya thought. (38)

  The three roots of evil are rāga (passion),dveṣa (hatred, enmity), and  moha  (ignorance, as delusion of   mind) ,  (39)  but,  in  addition,  Aśvaghoṣa occasionally  uses the guṇa term rajas to cover the two Buddhist  terms rāga and dveṣa  (B vii, 53 and n.). These three roots of evil, along with the three roots of good, are the cause  (hetu) by which karman is perpetuated. Interestingly, in the Pali Nikāyas, nirvāṇa is achieved with the disappearance  of the three  roots  of evil, (40) a feat  achieved  in the Saundarananda by yoga techniques. (41) Similarly, in this  early  stage  of Sāṃkhya, liberation  occurs when the guṇa-s  rajas  and tamas are destroyed  by the increase  of sattva  (B  xxvi  10-11) . The destruction  of  ignorance  (and  the  acquisition of knowledge) is complemented  by an increase  in  good deeds  and  moral  merit, and  this  destruction  of ignorance   is  brought  about  "through   learning, intelligence  and  effort"  (B xxvi  11).  Certainly 'effort' involves a meditational process (as it does in the Saundarananda text and Yoga).42

  Worth noting, however, are the differences between the Buddhist hetu and the guṇa-s, since Aśvaghoṣa criticizes the early Sāṃkhya salvational  model as self-contradictory.  Essentially  he argues  (B xxvi 10-14) that sattva can never destroy rajas and tamas because, by  definition, all  three  are  permanent. (43) Aśvagoṣa, in contrast, accepts  the  standard notion  of the skandha-s, which  are impermanent  by definition, and whose karmic causes can therefore be destroyed. (44)

[Ассаджи]

THE FIVE SKANDHA-S AND THE SĀṂKHYA TATTVA-S OF MATTER

Interestingly,  the  content   of  these   skandha-s corresponds  closely to the early Sāṃkhya analysis of the  corporeal individual,  omitting the avyakta. (45) The  skandha  rupa  (physical  form,  body)  is analogous  to the elements  and  their  evolutes, the objects  of the senses;  vedanā (sensation) equates with the senses; samjñā (ideation, perception, the naming  faculty) with  the Sāṃkhya  manas  (mind); vijñāna (consciousness) with the early buddhi; and saṃskāra  (dispositions, formative  forces, mental phenomena), insofar  as it was thought  to relate to the  "integrating  action  of the  personality, with ahaṃkāra" (46) An additional comparative  point involves  the influence  of "the power  of the act" in both systems, it being  one of the  three   causes   of  transmigration   in  early Sāṃkhya  (B xii 23) and also serving  as the means by which the skandha-s are perpetuated (S xvii 19).

THE SĀṂKHYA  CAUSES  OF SAṂSĀRA  AND THE FACTORS THROUGH WHICH THEY WORK

Returning again to Arāḍa's  Sāṃkhya description, the sage  first  first  gives  the three  causes  of saṃsāra  as being wrong knowledge  (ajñāna), the power  of the  act (karman), and  desire  or craving (tṛṣṇā  [B xii  23]).  These  three  causes  are comparable   to  the   Buddhist   cause   (hetu)  of transmigration: moha  (ignorance,  delusion),  rāga (passion), and dveṣa (hatred, enmity). Within early Sāṃkhya, the  three  causes  seem  to function  by eight factors  (B xii 23-24) in a manner as follows: (47)

Saṃsāra


┌------------------------┬---------------------------------------┐
│    Three causes of   │      Factors by which the three   │
│         saṃsāra          │                causes work               │
├------------------------┼---------------------------------------┤
│wrong knowledge   │1.misunderstanding (vipratyaya  │
│            (ajñāna)       │                      [see B xii 25])       │
│                                │  2.wrong attribution of person-  │
│                                │  ality (ahaṃkāra [see B xii 26]) │
│                                │3.confusion of thought(saṃdeha │
│                                │                      [see B xii 27])       │
│                                │4.wrong conjunction (abhisamp-│
│                                │                    lava [see B xii 28])  │
│                                │5.lack of discrimination              │
│                                │  (aviśeṣa [see B xii 29])              │
├------------------------┼---------------------------------------┤
│power of the act      │6.wrong means (anupāya          │
│ (karman)                 │  [see B xii 30])                           │
├------------------------┼---------------------------------------┤
│desire or craving      │7.attachment (saṅga                  │
│ (tṛṣṇā)                     │                      [see B xii 31])       │
│                                 │8.falling away (abhyavapāta      │
│                                 │                     [see B xii 32])       │
└------------------------┴---------------------------------------┘
Arāḍa  continues  by explaining  what he means  by each of the eight factors  by which the three causes of saṃsāra  function  (B xii  25-32). After  having done so, however, he also attributes  transmigration to a fivefold  ignorance  (B xii 33-37),(48) as well as  to  a  person's  unjusted  identification   with corporeal  individuality  (B xii 38).  It is unclear how  these  descriptions   of  the  causes  and  the perpetuataion of saṃsāra are related.(49)Interesting to note, however, is that the fivefold ignorance Arāḍa identifiess--torpor (tamas),delusion (moha), great delusion  (mahāmoha), darkness (tāmisra) and blind  darkness (andhatāmisra)--become,in Sāṃkhyakārikā XLVIII,the five viparyaya-s(errors or misapprehensions).(50)

To summarize  the  complicated  development  of  the guṇa-s discussed  earlier: the three guṇa-s in the early Sāṃkhya  of Arāda are but bhāva-s, "states of being," each having moral qualities through which the unseen avyakta  attaches  a person to saṃsāra. The moral actions associated  with the three guṇa-s are  divided  into  two kinds: those  moral  actions containing  the  sattva  guṇa, propelling  a person into  higher  rebirth  (and eventual  release);  and those   containing   the  rajas   or  tamas   guṇa, perpetuating  the  cycle  of  existence.These  moral qualities  within  saṃsāra  have three causes, and these  causes  themselves  seem  to  work  by  eight factors that variously relate to each of them.  This twofold division of the three guṇa-s parallels  the division  and functions  of the three Buddhist roots of good and evil.  Liberation  is achieved  with the increase of sattva  (51)  and the concomitant extinguishment  of rajas  and tamas, a process  similarly described  in parts  of the  Mahābhārata  and Yoga Sūtras iii 55.

 Aśvaghoṣa choses not to mention  the  guṇa-s in Arāḍa's  early  Sāṃkhya  description  apparently because   he  considers   them  to  be  merely   the 'mechanism' through which avyakta attaches saṃsāra to  the  individual, and  their  description  is not considered   necessary   once  avyakta   itself is mentioned.

 Apparently the guṇa-s attain their classical, cosmological and psychological  significance  only when the term prakṛti  begins  to mean but the first  of twenty-four material tattva-s, and loses its meaning as the inclusive title of the eight tattva-s found in the earlier speculation.(52)

THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF SVABHĀVA  IN  RELATION  TO THE CLASSICAL  SĀṂKHYA  CONCEPTS OF PRAKṚTI, AVYAKTA, AND THE GUṆA-S

Having described  in part the evolution of prakṛti, avyakta, and the  guṇa-s  we now  can  connect  the development  of these  three  entities  with that of svabhāva, described  earlier.  What occurs  between the  time  of  Aśvaghoṣa   and  Īśvarakṛṣṇa's classical  work is that the features of svabhāva as the  motive  force  behind  the  eightfold  prakṛti become posited as the features  within the classical avyakta.  In the process, the latter acquires  a new meaning, different  from  the  (older) notion  of it being  the  'unseen   force'of   the  morallaw.   In classical  Sāṃkhya  it now means  the  "unmanifest force"  in which  lie at rest the manifold  creative power (as guṇapariṇāma) of the three guṇa-s. The moral qualities through which Arāda's early avyakta worked  are  transferred  from  the  guṇa-s  of the earlier thought to the eightfold bhāva-s within the buddhi of classical thought.(53)

 While Īśvarakṛṣṇa  rejects the idea that svabhāva is a creative principle, the concept may have influenced  classical  notion  in two  other  areas. First, svabhāva  as" the inherent nature of things' becomes the term used in relation with suffering  as the (apparent) linkage between  puruṣa and manifest creation in Sāṃkhya-kārikā LV.(54) if there is a connection, thought, between svabhhava in this later sense and the earlier  notion  of nature  underlying all  prakṛit, it is simply  that  now suffering  is what underlies all creation.

 Second, there is a quite early notion of svabhāva described  by Aśvaghoṣa  in Buddhacarita  ix 59-62 that  may have influenced  the classical  notion of guṇ-apariṇāma, the  ever-varying  proportions  of the interacting  guṇa-s  causing the manifestations of  prakṛti.  In  this  descriptions, Śuddhodana's counsellor  is stating  to the Boddhisattva  various philosophical, disputes of the day in a vain attempt to convince the latter to return to his home. One of the  materialistic   or  naturalistic   philosophies described  contains  a doctrine  in which  the  four elements (space being omitted from the usual list of five),(55) usually  in mutual opposition, now "group themselves together" according to their own inherent nature  (or  according  to natural  development) and from  the world.  One is reminded  of the  classical notion of the guṇa-s, whose natures  are dissimilar if not antagonistic, but that also interact  to from the  mainfest  universe.  While  indeed  there  is a similarity  between  these  two  ideas,  no  precise connection  between  the older syabhāva  notion and the classical  guṇapariṇāma  theory  can be drawn with certainty.(56)

BUDDHI

Comparatively  little is known about buddhi prior to the classical  period.  One of the  few  things  the texts  allow us to say is that the eithtfold  buddhi of classical  Sāṃkhya  is not  known  in Arāḍa's system. Furthermore, it also seems true that in some earlier   Sāṃkhya   systems   buddhi   should   be translated as "consciousness" (cetanā)or "intellect" (vijñāna), and  these  meanings  contrast  to  its characterization  within  the  classical  school  as simply  "ascertainment" or  "determination"(adyavasāya[SK XXIII]). This devaluation of buddhi probably occurs concomitant  with the developing  idea of the transcendence  fo puruṣa, the latter  itself  being considered  conscious as opposed to those emanations within material creation (prakṛti  in her vyakta or generating  form)  which  are  unconscious.  To  fit within  this  classical  dualism, the conception  of buddhi  has  to be appropriately  modified, and  its adyavasāya  designation  resulted.  However,  while this general outline  of the modification  of buddhi concept  holds true for the Mahābhārata, Arāḍa's references  to buddhi are too vague to allow placing Arāḍa's use within this scheme.(57)

AHAṂKĀRA AND ĀTMAN

While  the  function  of  ahaṃkāra   in  Arāḍa's Sāṃkhya   is  difficult  to  determine,  its  very appearance  within  it is  important  to  note  with regard  to the  development  of classical  Sāṃkhya thought.  It translates  as 'ego'  or 'I' and is the cause  of the corporeal  individual's  activity.  In part its purpose  in early  Sāṃkhya  is to subsume the functions  of two other principles, mahat ātman (Great  Self) and jīva ātman (individualized  self or  soul), both  of  which,  in  various  texts, had animated   the  body  and  connected   it  with  the transmigrating soul.(58) In the Buddhacarita, an association involving transmigration  seems to exist between the ātman and ahaṃkāra, as seen in one of the Bodhisattva's objections to Arāḍa's Sāṃkhya: "and  as for this  imagined  abandonment  of the ego principle (ahaṃkāra), as long as the soul (ātman) persists, there is no abandonment of that principle" (B xii, 76).(59)

By the time of Īśvarakṛṣṇa's  classical system, the ātman  has disappeared  and  its transmigrating function  is assumed  by the  subtle  body  (liṅga, liṅgaśarīra). In addition, ahaṃkāra assumes the individual  aspects  of  ātman,(60) already  having been  associated  previously  with  it  (as  in  the Buddhacarita).

Buddhi, Ahaṃkāra, and Cosmological Speculation

Although early Sāṃkhya (as well as early Buddhism) emphasizes the investigation  of the individual more than the cosmos, when the cosmos is considered it is usually done through  mythological  means.(61) So we find  in Buddhacarita  xii 21 that Kapila  (a famous Indian sage reputed to be the founder  of Sāṃkhya) and  his pupil  (probably  āsuri) are  symbolic  of buddhi,(62) Prajāpati symbolizes ahaṃkāra(63) and Prajāpati's  sons represent  the five elements.(64) Unrelated  to this  particular  set  of mythological figures is another set of cosmological speculations, also in the twelfth canto.  In Arāḍa's description of the trances(dhyāna-s), each arūpya (attainment) is associated  with certain divine spheres, and such associations   probably   are  indicative   of  Yoga practices of this time.(65) It is worth noting that, in a similar view,there are cosmological associations between  the three worlds  and the three guṇa-s  in Sāṃkhyākarikā LIV. The modest conclusion that we can  deduce  from  this  material  is that  in early Sāṃkhya,  early  Yoga,  classical  Sāṃkhya,  and later  Yoga  there  is the  notion  that  liberation includes  a journey through the cosmos, probably  to reach a location  beyond the control of cosmological fate.

ELEMENTS,  GROSS  ELEMENTS,  SUBTLE   ELEMENTS,  AND OBJECTS OF THE SENSES

Two categories of principles (tattva-s) exist within Arāḍa's Sāṃkhya  that are not found in the later Sāṃkhya    scheme    of   the   Sāṃkhyākarikā. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's  system  has not accepted  either the  five  objects  of the senses  (B xii 19) or the five  elements   (B  xii  18)  within  its  list  of twenty-four  material evolutes, although both groups are  easily  mistaken  for  being  in the  classical system.  Notions underlying  Arāḍa's five elements (bhūta-s) -- space  (ākāśa), wind  (vāyu), fire (tejas), water  (ap) and  earth  (pṛthivī) --  are less philosophically  discriminative than those upon which  the classical  five  gross  elements  -- also space, wind, fire, water, earth  --  are  based, but the agreement of the names themselves often obscures this fact. Nor do the gross elements have generative potential as do the earlier elements.

 Similarly, the  five  objects of the senses within Arāḍa's  description  --  śabda  (sound) ,  rūpa (form) ,  sparśa  (touch),  gandha  (smell) ,  rasa (taste) --  appear  to  be  the  same  as  the  five classical  subtle  elements  (tanmātra-s), but this appearance falls away with the realization that the latter five of the Sāṃkhyakārikā  are both subtle potentials above  the  plane  of gross  corporeality, and  also productive entities themselves. The early objects of the  senses, in contrast, are  not productive  (that is, nothing further is emanated  from them) and they exist within the material, perceptible  creations of the  world.  It  is true, however, that  these  four categories  -- the elements, the gross elements, the subtle elements, and the senseobjects  -- undergo  a complicated transformation as the early Sāṃkhya is evolving toward Īśvarakṛṣṇa's work.

THE ELEMENTS

Beginning  with the five elements  found within  the primary  matter (prakṛti) of early Sāṃkhya, their productive capacity can be explained by the state of philosophical  speculations during an era which made "no hard and fast distinction  between  animate  and inanimate,  between   material   and  spiritual,  or between  substance  and quality."(66) These elements were "cosmic forces inhering in the substances  from which  they  took  their  name," and it was accepted that   from  them   composition   of  the  secondary evolutes, (68) but  the  Buddhacarita  says  nothing about the evolutionary  process  from the primary to the secondary groupings.

OBJECTS OF THE SENSES

Five of the evloutes within Arāḍa's  nonproductive secondary  matter  are the  objects  of the  senses, traditionally  known  as  sound, form, touch, smell, and taste.  These were the five basic  qualities  or attributes  perceived  by the senses.  The  lack  of philosophical  clarity,  however, between  substance and quality  meant that the material  objects of the world are classified  according to the qualities (of sound, taste, and so on) that the senses perceive.(69) Each sense  object  may have been "the  special  and sole object of one of the organs of sense," and also may  have  had  an  association  with  a  particular element.(70)

 Refinements  of thought  in the Vaiśeṣika school could  have  stimulated   Sāṃkhya  into  modifying several of its components.  Vaiśeṣika  established the relationship between the elements (earth, water, fire, air, and space) and their respective qualities (smell,  taste,  form, touch, and  sound),  and  the latter  group  serves   as  the  objects   of  sense perception.(71) These qualities existed only insofar as they inhered in the elements themselves, and this fact  probably   presented   a  problem   for  early Sāṃkhya thought.  In the Buddhacarita's  Sāṃkhya system, the objects  of the senses  have  a separate identity   from   the   elements   (bhūta-s) ,  and Vaiśeṣika   critics   could   have   argued   that individual  elements exist only insofar as they were particularized  by their inherent  qualities.  While early Sāṃkhya would not have accepted the premises of the  Vaiśeṣika  argument, it nonetheless  could have  been  clear   that  Vaiśeṣika   had  made  a philosophical  advance  by  distinguishing   between substances  and  their  qualities.  If the  elements produced the objects of the senses,(72) then early Sāṃkhya  would  have been  hard-pressed  to explain  how  the  generative elements produce nongenerative entities (the objects of  the  senses) that  are  nothing  but  their  own qualities.(73)

 These Vaiśeṣika developments could have influenced classical Sāṃkhya's interpretations of both the elements  and their  sense objects.(74) In any case, the  objects  of the senses  are  removed  from  its cosmological scheme of twenty-four material entities, and  the  Sāṃkhyakārikā   only   makes   passing reference  to them as the objects  of the organs  of action  (SK  XXVIII   and  XXXIV) .   The  elements, previously  thought  to  have  been  productive, are reduced to unregenerative tattva-s found at the last stage of the emanation process.  By eliminating  the five  sense  objects, however,  a  vacancy  of  five tattva-s is created,and this vacancy is subsequently filled   with   a  new  fivefold   designation,  the tanmātra-s  (subtle  elements) .  Within  Sāṃkhya speculation  this  new group  appears  for the first time  in the Sāṃkhyakārikā  and not gonly  fills the numerical  vacancy created  by the expulsion  of the  five  objects  of sense, but  also  now  has  a creative  potency that had been assigned  previously to the elements.  Its five individual members bear a resemblance  to the names of the five sense objects, but no correspondence  exists in the functioning  of the two. The tanmātra-s are conceived as "extremely fine or subtle potentials" that combine to produce the corporeal world (For example,the mahābhūta-s). (75)   While   Vaiśeṣika   distinguishes   between substances  and (among  other  things) the qualities and specificities(viśeṣa-s) which inhere  in them, classical   Sāṃkhya   distinguishes   between  the nonspecific  (aviśeṣa)  subtle  elements  and  the specific   (viśeṣa)  gross   elements   which  are generated out of them.

[Ассаджи]

SUMMARY: ELEMENTS  OBJECTS  OF  THE  SENSES,  SUBTLE ELEMENTS, AND GROSS ELEMENTS

Having thus suggested a possible explanation for the appearance  of the classical Sāṃkhya  tanmātra-s, we  can  now  understand  the  complex  relationship between  Arāḍa's  elements  and the objects of the senses and Īśvarakṛṣṇa's  subtle  elements  and gross  elements.  The early Sāṃkhya  elements  are found within  the eightfold  creative  prakṛti, the latter  generating   the  sixteen  constituents   of secondary  matter  through  its underlying  inherent nature of svabhāva.  At this stage of philosophical thought, no difference is made between substance and quality, so no scrutiny of the substantive nature or corporeality   of  the  elemental  concept  has  yet occurred, as  will  happen  within  the  Vaiśeṣika school, In a manner which is not entirely clear, the five  sense  objects  (along  with the other  eleven tattva-s  of secondary  matter) are  generated  from prakṛti,  and  each  of  the  five  seems  to  have particular  relationships  not only  with the senses but also with individual elements.

  This early Sāṃkhya scheme may have been affected by  the  Vaiśeṣika   analysis  of  substance   and quality.  As a logical consequence of this analysis, the general acceptance  of the elements as corporeal substances may have stimulated Sāṃkhya  to remove from them not only their status as  primary  tattva-s   but  also  their  previously assigned generative capacities. At the same time the five objects  of the senses are no longer considered substantive   entities   but  rather  qualities   or attributes  of substantive  entities  that give them their specific characteristics.

  The  necessary  adjustments  are  made within  the classical  system  by  eliminating  the  five  sense objects  and relegating  the elements  to the lowest position  in the evolutionary  process -- a position indicative  of their corporeal  and gross substance. The five vacancies  created by the exclusion  of the sense objects  are filled by the subtle  elements, a new  group   within   Sāṃkhya   speculation   that necessarily   assumes   the  creative   capabilities previously held by the elements and that allows them to serve  as the generative  source  for  the  gross elements.

THE KNOWER  OF THE  FIELD  (KṢETRAJÑA), PURUSA, AND ĀTMAN

The soul or Soul is regarded  both as ātman  (B xii 20 and 81), and the knower of the field (kṣetrajña [B xii 20 and 80]), an association  also  common  in the  Mahābhārata.(76)  In  Arāḍa's  system  both terms have individual  and cosmic  significance,(77) but their  exact  meaning  is unclear.  One  way  to explain thdir difference is to regard ātman usually as  the  "cosmic  soul"  and  kṣetrajña  as  "that portion  of the cosmic soul that is attached  to the individual."(78) The difficulty  becomes, of course, understanding   exactly  what  the  relationship  is between the individual and cosmic soul.

  The best clue regarding the difference is given in Buddhacarita  xii  80-81, in which  the  ātman  (as soul) is understood  to be unknowing (ajña) and the knower  of the  field  (kṣetrajña) to  be  knowing (jña).  Presumably this knowing is in regard to the field  of primary  and  secondary  evolutes, and the soul's true separation from it.

  Earlier, in  Buddhacarita  xii  65, there exists a description  of the liberated  knower  of the  field (kṣetrajña) as "that  supreme  Absolute  (paramaṃ brahma) ,  without   attribute,   everlasting,   and immutable".  Two  verses  earlier, the  term  "self" (ātman)  is  used   enigmatically:  "But   another, skilled in regard to the inner self, causes his self to cease  by his self  and since  he sees  there  is nothing, he is declared  to be one for whom  nothing exists" (B xii 63). In this passage, the last of the 'selves'  seems to be equated with the knower  of the field  in xii 64, and it is the latter  who achieves liberation.

  Several things  need to  be said about these three enigmatic  verses  (B  xii  63-65) in an attempt  to clarify Arāḍa's  use of ātman and kṣetrajña  in the  early  Sāṃkhya  sections.  To begin, it seems that  the  term  kṣetrajña  is the name  given  to ātman, when, as it gains liberation, it 'knows  the field'  of creation.  Prior to liberation, ātman is ajña, unknowing (B xii 80-81).(79)

  Next,I take the three references to "self" in Buddhacarita  xii 63 to mean that the cosmic, 'knowing' self associated with Brahman causes the individual's inmost psychological  nature  or essence, 'the inner self', to cease its notion of a 'personality' self. Finally, the supreme Absolute is not to be taken  as a cosmic  being but rather  as a cosmic  condition  of mokṣa.  Sen Gupta points  out that had this term been understood  as indicating  a supreme  God, the Bodhisattva  certainly  would have criticized  the theory on these grounds.(80) Keeping all of this in mind, I reinterpret Buddhacarita  xii 63 to mean, "But another, skilled  in regard  to the cosmic ātman, causes his unknowing self to cease by his kṣetrajña...."

  Of  significance  for  the  later  doctrine of the classical  puruṣa  is that  the difference  between kṣetra and kṣetrajña  explicitly foreshadows  the classical dualism. Furthermore, the unknowing ātman and the knowing  kṣetrajña  are  reflected  in the classical   doctrines   of   the   deluded   puruṣa 'apparently'  entangled in matter and the witnessing puruṣa  conscious  of its separate  nature from it. The  descriptions   of  the  supreme   Absolute   in Buddhacarita xii 65 ("without attribute, everlasting and  immutable")  resemble   those  of  puruṣa   in Sāṃkhyakārikā  XIX  (possessed  of isolation  or freedom,  inactive, and  indifferent).  Finally, the similarity  between the individual  kṣetrajña  and the individual puruṣa-s is striking.

  Of course there are significant differences between Arāḍa's and Īśvarakṛṣṇa's school.The classical scheme  is much  more  insistent  on the ontological separation of puruṣa and prakṛti than is the early separation  between  kṣetrajña  and  kṣetra.  One suspects   that,  to   an  adherent   of   classical Sāṃkhya, even the statement in Buddhacarita xii 64 that  liberation  occurs  when  the  "knower  of the field...escape(s)  the body" would be considered  to have unjustly  compromised  the absolute  separation between the material and the nonmaterial principles. (81) Furthermore, the term ātman does not appear in the  Sāṃkhya-kārikā,its transmigrating and individualizing  functions  having  been  assumed  by the subtle body and ahaṃkāra, respectively.

THE BODHISATTVA'S  REJECTION  OF ARĀḌA'S SĀṂKHYA SYSTEM

All  of the Bodhisattva's  refutations  of Arāḍa's Sāṃkhya  doctrines  challenge, in  some  way,  the existence of the soul (ātman).  Within this overall framework,  the  Bodhisattva's   arguments   can  be divided  into two categories: those  describing  the necessary continuation of samsar-ic potencies within an  ātman;  and  those  which  criticize  Arāḍa's notion of knowledge.  Regarding the continuation  of samsar-ic    potencies   within   an   ātman,   the Bodhisattva  begins  his refutation  by saying  that when the kṣetrajña  achieves his separation  "from the primary and secondary constituents" (B xii, 70), the inactivity of the mind, and the longevity of the state itself create the "imagination" of it being an eternal  condition  (B xii, 74).  However, the three causes (hetu-s) of karman and transmigration  -- the power  of the  act, ignorance, and  desire  -- still "remain  in a subtle state"  within the soul (B xii, 74) ,  since   the  latter   contains   the  "causal conditions"  in which  they grow.  Consequently, the soul  itself  is  described  as  "a seed"  for  both further  transmigration  and further  karman  (B xii 70-71). Inevitably the soul will find " that it will again become bound from the continued  existence  of causal  conditions"  (B  xii  71).  Furthermore, the Bodhisattva    asserts    that   the   ego-principle (ahaṃkāra, probably  used  in its animating  and transmigrating sense  described  earlier) persists  as long as does the soul (B xii, 76).(82)

  The  next set of  three arguments  are those which are directed  at the Sāṃkhya  notion of knowledge, each  of the three  addressing  a different  meaning related  to the word "knowledge"  itself.  The first argument   located  "knowledge"   as  "reason"   and criticizes  the Sāṃkhya liberation  by saying that since  the "activity  of reason"  is an attribute, a soul that possesses  such  an attribute  necessarily becomes  identified  with  it, just  as  a  fire  is identified with its attributes of outward appearance and  heat.   Liberation,  therefore,  has  not  been achieved (B xii 77-78).(83) What is at issue here is whether  the knower  of the field  ever can separate permanently  from its field, and the Bodhisattva  is claiming that the kṣetrajña cannot.

The  Bodhisattva  continues  along  these  lines  by stating  that  the very  nature  of a kṣetrajña, a knower  of the field, necessitates  that there  be a kṣetra, a field  for it ot know, and this necessity of an orientation to a field precludes the knower of the field from ever being released permanently  from it (B.  xii 79-80). The Bodhisattva has not accepted the claim Arāḍa  made that the knower of the field obtains freedom from " the rushing  torrent of birth and death" (B.  xii 41) by "properly" discriminating the "mind, voice, intellect, and action" (B, xii 31) --  that  is, "that  which  lacks  intelligence, the seen"  -- from "the intelligent....the  unseen"  (B. xii 40) . The Bodhisattva responds that discrimination  is not enough  for  a soul  to gain  permanent liberation, since its necessary  orientation  to the field  of existence  invariably  draws  it into  the cycle of transmigration.(84)

  The final  argument  against Arāḍa's  liberation scheme is directed against the soul in its ātman or unknowing  state.  The Bodhisattva  charges that the existence  of the quality  of unknowing  need not be established  through the existence of an ātman that lacks knowledge.  As is the case with common things, like logs or walls, "the quality  of not-knowing  is well established"  without them having an ātman (B. xii 81).  When combined  with the previous  argument about  the  impossibility   of  a  kṣetrajña  ever gaining  complete   release   from  its  field,  the Bodhisattva  seems  to be saying  that, if Arāḍa's liberation  system involves a change occurring  from an unknowing  to a knowing state, then neither state requires  that  an ātman  exist  for the change  to occur.

  Nonetheless,  the conclusion reached through  each of these arguments is that everything  resembling  a doctrine of a soul has to be abandoned  before there will be assurance  that liberation  from matter will be permanent.  Beyond knowledge  of the field is the complete "abandonment of everything" (B. xii 82).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Aśvaghoṣa,  through  the  character   of  Arāḍa, describes  an early Sāṃkhya that on certain points has basic affinities  with various  other  Sāṃkhya descriptions  dating around the first centuries C.E. It  is a Sāṃkhya  of  twenty-five  principles, one principle   standing   rather   separate   from  the twenty-four material tattva-s(principles.) This material group of twenty-four tattva-s is divided into primary and secondary forms. Primary matter, called prakṛti, is thought to be eightfold, and consists of avyakta, buddhi, abaṃkāra, and the five bhuta-s (elements). From these eight principles are  produced  the  sixteen  tattva-s  of  secondary matter, called vikāra (a production or derivative). (Unfortunately   the  text  does  not  describe  the specifics  as to how this generation  takes  place.) These sixteen tattva-s include the usual five senses plus a sixth, manas (mind) (as was typical  for this period  of Indian  thought), the five sense objects, and the hands and feet, the voice, and the organs of generation  and excretion  (elsewhere  known  as the karmendriya-s, the  organs  of action).  All sixteen are considered to be uncreative and ungenerative.

  Underlying  the eightfold  prakṛti is a principle called  svabhāva,  which  is  thought   to  be  the (inherent) nature by which the eightfold prakṛti is creative and generative.By the time of the classical scheme, the  notion  of  a nature  (or  an  inherent nature) causing  the  creation  of the universe  has become posited  in the avyakta, which as "unmanifest force"  carried  a different  meaning  than does the first tattva of early Sāṃkhya, avyakta  as "unseen force."   This  inherent   nature   that   motivates generativity  within  classical  Sāṃkhya  does  so through the three guṇa-s, and by having these three exist  within  avyakta,  the  latter  obtains   both attributes   and  characteristics,  making  it  more plausible  as the source of all creation.  The basic scheme,  however, of  a  horizontal  emanation  that exists  in  early  Sāṃkhya's   eightfold  prakṛti reappears in the classical system's emanations  from ahaṃkāra of the karmendriya-s, the buddhīndriya-s, manas, and the tanmatra-s.

  While  Aśvaghoṣa  does  not  mention  the  three guṇa-s  in  canto  xii,  his  omission  simply  may indicate  that  at this  early  stage  they  are not considered  to  be  significant  in the  process  of creation.  The guṇa-s are conceived to be the three bhāva-s,  states   of  being,  having   the   moral qualities   through  which  avyakta  (unseen  force) attaches  a person  to  saṃsāra.  The  guṇa-s, as moral qualities  in this text, are divided  into two groups: those  qualities  and actions  of the sattva guṇa  that lead to higher  rebirths  (and  eventual release);  and those  qualities  and actions  of the rajas  and tamas guṇa-s  that lead to lower births. In  this  twofold  division  one  can  see  concepts similar to the Buddhist  roots of good (=sattva) and evil  (=rajas  and  tamas) which  also  determine  a person's condition of rebirth.

  The cause or causes of saṃsāra are unclear,since Arāḍa  gives three different  causal  schemes, and the schemes  themselves  cannot  be linked together. First, he claims the causes of saṃsāra to be wrong knowledge (ajñāna), power of the act (karman), and desire  or  craving  (tṛṣṇā),  and  these  three causes themselves  function by eight factors.  Next, he attributes transmigration to a fivefold ignorance, and  immediately  follows  by saying  that  a person "wanders in the cycle of transmigration"  because of his false identification with corporeal individuality.

  Early  Sāṃkhya  salvation is  thought of  as the increase    of   sattva    with    an   accompanying extinguishment  of  rajas  and  tamas.   The  Buddha criticizes this Sāṃkhya  notion  of release  by saying that if all three guṇa-s  were permanent  entities, then sattva could not destroy the other two, which thereby makes release impossible  to achieve.  Buddhism avoids the difficulty of permanent but non-liberating  entities by describing  the individual  as being composed  of five  impermenant  skandha-s,  but  one  notes  with interest  that, with  the exception  of avyakta, the early Sāṃkhya primary and secondary emanations can be correlated with them.

  Having  mentioned briefly  the  evolution of early avyakta into the classical tattva-s of the same name but  different  internal  forces, we can  say little about  two of the remaining  seven  tattva-s  of the early  period,  buddhi  and  ahaṃkāra.   From  the Mahābhārata  we know  that  buddhi  may have  been thought  to be consciousness  (cetanā) or intellect (vijñāna),  conceptualizations  that  have  to  be modified  within  the  classical  system  so  as  to maintain the unconscious  nature of prakṛti and her evolutes.

  Ahaṃkāra(ego) probably has some association with attaching an animating principle to an individualized transmigrating  soul.  In the classical period it fully  subsumes  the individual  aspects  of ātman, while the transmigrating  aspects  of the latter are posited within the subtle body.  Finally, ahaṃkāra and  buddhi   in  Arāda's   system   probably   has applicability   more  to  notions   concerning   the individual than to the cosmos, since when the cosmos is referred  to it is done only through mythological figures.   Within   the   classical   system   their cosmological significance is expanded.

  Concerning the remaining  five of the eight  early tattva-s  of  prakṛti  -- the  five  elements  -- a considerable  amount  can be said.  In the classical system  they are not creative  principles, and their closest   approximation   is  the  five   uncreative principles  lowest  in  the  emanation  process, the mahabhūta-s.   Their   demotion   to   ungenerative tattva-s   might   have  occurred   under  the  same influence   that   also  might   have   caused   the disappearance  of the  five  sense  objects  in  the Sāṃkhyakārikā  emanation  scheme:  the  critical examination  of the difference between substance and qualities undertaken in the Vaiśeṣika school.  The pressures  that could have been felt as a result  of this examination  could  have affected  not only the new   interpretation   of  the   elements   as  mere substances  within  Īśvarakṛṣṇa's  system,  but also the removal  from the emanation  scheme  of the five sense  objects  as a consequence  of their  new status as nothing but qualities or attributes of the organs of action  (karmendriya-s).  In the numerical places  of the early elements  are posited  the five subtle elements  (tanmātra-s), and this replacement allows  classical  Sāṃkhya  to both  maintain  the tradition  of twenty-five  tattva-s  and provide the mahabhūta-s with a generative source.

  While  the  distinction  within  Arāḍa's  system betweem  kṣetrajña   and  ātman  is  not  clearly delineated, it appears  that the latter  is the term applied  to the former  when ātman  is still within the influence of saṃsāra. This distinction that is made between kṣetrajña  (knower  of the field) and kṣetra (the field of matter) is a precursor  to the classical dualism between puruṣa and prakṛti.

  The Bodhisattva's rejection of Arāḍa's Sāṃkhya notion   of   liberation    concentrates    on   the difficulties  with  the postulation  of a soul.  The first set of refutations address the question of the subtle samsar-ic  potencies  of the three hetu-s and ahaṃkāra  within  a kṣetrajña.  The next  set of refutations  criticize various notions of knowledge. One attack  is against  the  notion  of a liberating knowledge  that is either  one of "reasoning"  or of "knowing  the field  of matter," since  both qualify the eternal  nature  of the liberated  state  due to their necessary  external orientation  to an entity. The other attack  implies  that a state of unknowing exists independently of an ātman, just as the state of  salvific   knowing   exists   independently   of kṣetrajña.In the final analysis, only the complete abandonment  of  everything  ensures  complete  and eternal liberation.

[Ассаджи]

NOTES

 1. E.h. Johnston, The Buddhacarita:or, The Acts of the  Buddha   Part   I,  Sanskrit   Text;   Part  II translation, cantos  I-XIV.  (1936;  reprint  Delhi: Motilal  Banarsidass, 1972).  All English renditions of  these  cantos, as  well  as  references  to  the introductory  remarks (indicated by Roman numerals), are from Part II.  Translation  of cantos  XV-XXVIII are from the Tibetan, Acta Orientalia, XV.

 2. Arāḍa (Pali, Aḷāra Kālāma) was, according to tradition, one of Gautama's  teachers  after  the Bodhisattva's  renunciation.  Of the various sketchy accounts  of his  teachings, only  the  Buddhacarita indicates that his doctrines resembled Sāṃkhya-yoga. Even  then, the dhyāna-s  to which  Arāḍa  refers were  Buddhist, not  orthodox  Yoga, in nature.  See G.P.  Malalasekara, Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, I (London: Luzac and Co.,1960), p.297;  also Indumate Karunartne, "Āḷāra  Kālāma, "  Encyclopedia  of Buddhism, ed. G.P. Malalasekera, Fascicule A-ACA (n. p.: Government  of  Ceylon, nḍ.), p.378;  Biswanath Bhattacharya, Aśvaghoṣa: A  Critical  Study  (West Bengal: Santiniketan, 1976),pp.403-409.

 3. The term "sāṃkhya" itself appears in Mokṣadharma  12.228.27, 28,36:12.232.1  (in  reference  to 12.231.5);  12.289.4-5;  and 12.290.59-60.  So cites Franklin  Edgerton  in  The  Beginnings   of  Indian Philosophy  (Cambridge:  Harvard  University  Press, 1965),p.36,n.2.Elsewhere  appear references  to "the path  of knowledge"  and  descriptions  of emanation systems that are Sāṃkhya in nature.

 4. B pp.lvi-lvii; 172, n.33.Gerald Larson, however, says Johnston's claim that the common source was the Vārṣagaṇya  school  is based  upon weak evidence
For Larson's detailed  discussion  see his Classical Sāṃkhya (Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1969), pp.109, 151-155.

 5. Edgerton, ibid., indicates that the term "sāṃkhya: appears in the Bhagavadgītā at II.39, iii.3 v.4-5.  References  to  the  system, however, appear elsewhere  in the text, even though  the term itself is not used.  See  Franklin  Edgerton, The  Bhagavad Gītā (1944; reprint, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 196-198;R.C.Zaehner, The Bhagavad-Gītā  (New York: Oxford  University  Press, 1973), pp.139-141  203.  An interesting  interpretation  of Sāṃkhya  in the  Bhagavadgītā  is David  White's "Proto-Sāṃkhya   and  Advaita   Vedānta   in  the Bhagavadgītā,  "  Philosophy  East  and  West  29, no.4(October, 1979): 501-507.

 6. Johnston  believes that the older parts  of the Bhagavadgītā  could  have  been  in  existence  in Aśvaghoṣa's  day, having  dated  the poet's  works from "between 50 B.C.and 100 Aḍ., with a preference for   the  first   century   Aḍ."   (B.,  p.xvii) . Bhattacharya,  Asvaghoṣa,  p.19,  places  the  poet "about 100 Aḍ."

 7. Larson,Classical Saṃkhya,p.242. Dasgupta dates the Caraka  Saṃhitā  at 70 Aḍ.  Sṇ.  Dasgupta, A History  of  Indian  Philosophy,  I(1922;   reprint, London: Cambridge University Press, 1955), p.213.

 8. For a  critique of the Sāṃkhya system  within the  Caraka  Saṃhitā,  see  Dasgupta,  History  of Indian Philosophy, pp.213-217.

 9. For a brief but informative discussion  of  the most obvious instances  of Sāṃkhya metaphysics  in the Upaniṣads, see Robert Ernest Hume, The Thirteen Principal  Upanishads  (2d  ed.  1931;  reprint, New York: Oxford  University  Press, 1971), pp.8-9.  The term "sāṃkhya-yoga" appears in śvet. U.6.13.

 10. On the meaning of the word "Sāṃkhya : Edgerton  says  "it  is  the  rationalizing,  reflective,
speculative  philosphical method.....[the]  'reason-method'.  It seems  a natural  term to describe  the method of gaining salvation by 'knowledge'" (Beginnings, p.36).

 11. All quotes from classical Sāṃkhya are  taken from Larson's translation  of the Sāṃkhya Kārikā (SK).

 12. Eliade  dates the  Sāṃkhyakārikā as  being not  later  than  the  5th  century  C.E.  Dasgupta, however, dates it to about 200 C.E.Larson  says that the Sāṃkhyakārikā  was translated  into  Chinese between  557-569  C.E., so we can presume  that  the original  existed  before  then.  See Mircea Eliade, Patanjali and Yoga, trans.  Charles Lam Markham (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), p.16; Dasgupta, History of Indian  Philosophy, p.212;  and Larson, Classical Saṃkhya, p.4.

 13. Franklin  Edgerton, " The  Meaning of Sānkhya and  Yoga, " American Journal of Philosophy 45, no.1 (1924): 32, see pp.36f; also Beginnings, pp.36-39.

 14. See Larson,Classical Saṃkhya, pp.128-139, esp.
pp.133-136.

 15. Larson, Classical Saṃkhya, p.133.

 16. The dhyāna-s which Arāḍa describes are ones that,  with  a  single  exception, a  Buddhist  monk achieves.  On the claim  that the Sāṃkhya  and the Yoga  of the Buddhacarita do not represent  distinctive schools but are two aspects of the same school, see  Larson,  Classical  Saṃkhya,  p.130.   On  the relationship  between  orthodox  Yoga  and  Buddhist dhyāna-s, including  the ones described  by Arāda, see: Malalasekara, Dictionary, p.297;  Louis  de  la Valle'e  Poussin,  "Le  Bouddhisme  et  le  Yoga  de Patanjali,  "  M'elanges   Chinois   et  Bouddhiques (1936-1937), pp.228-230.

 17. Johnston  divides  early Sāṃkhya into  three chronological periods-an atheistic stage, a theistic stage,  and  another  atheistic  stage.  Larson,  in contrast, prefers  to avoid a chronological  scheme, and instead  wishes "simply  to point to the various strands or traditions of speculation and to show how they come together in the later texts of the period" (p.139).  For the purposes  of this article, we have adopted an approach  similar to Larson's.  See: E.H. Johnston, Early  Sāṃkhya  (1937;  reprint,  Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974),pp.80-87.

 18. E.H.Johnston, The Saundarananda: or, Nanda the Fair (London:Oxford University Press, 1932).

 19. All  references to the  Yoga  Sūtras will  be taken from: James Haughton Woods, The Yoga System of Patañjali, Harvard  Oriental  Series, vol.17 (1914; reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972).

 20. The sages listed by Arāḍa are similarly cited in the Mahābhārata  as being  Sāṃkhya  teachers. K.Bṛamakrishna   Rao,  "The  Buddhacarita  and  the Sāṃkhya   of  Arāḍa  Kālāma, "  Adyar  Library Bulletin 28 (1964): 232.

 21. On the development of the term 'ātman' in the Upaniṣads,see Hume,The Thirteen Principal Upanisads, pp.23-32.

 22. For  a discussion of the development  of  this term  within  the  context  of  the  Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, and the Bhagavadgītā, see  Zaehner, The Bhagavad-Gītā, pp.333-335. The earliest use of the term is śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad 6.16, where it appears to be "an alternate  word for the puruṣa of the Sāṃkhya system" (p.333). For its appearance in the Mahābhārata  and the Pañcarātra  system, see Johnston, Early, pp.44-45.

 23. In Edgerton's translation of  Mbh. 12.298, the generation  of  a  twenty-four   principle  material nature,   similar   to   Arāḍa's,  is   described. Beginning  with the avyakta, each of the tattva-s of prakṛti  emanate  out of the previous  one, and the objects  of the sense  emanate  out of the elements. The rest of the process is jumbled.  See Beginnings, pp.323-324.

 24. Compare SK XIX.

 25. As  a consequence of the  Tibetan and  Chinese words  used for "nature," there  is some  linguistic difficulty determining whether the original Sanskrit word was prakṛti  or svabhāva, but the context  of the argument  leads Johnston  to decide  firmly upon the latter. See Early, pp.70-71; also Bvg. v.14.

 26. Johnston, B, p.lvix; Early, pp.70-71.

 27. Johnston,  Early,  p.70. Put  differently, the debate  here  is over  the  consturction  of  causal chains of existence within early Indian speculation. Karl  H.Potter  points  out that these  chains  were areas of contention  between the different  schools. See  his  Presuppositions  of  India's  Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963), pp.106-111.

 28. SK X: "The manifest (vyakta) is caused, finite, nonpervasive, active supported  emergent, composite, dependent.   The   unmanifest   (avyakta)   is   the opposite." SK XI; (Both) the manifest and unmanifest are (characterized  by the) three guṇa-s (qualities or 'strands'); undiscriminating, objective; general; nonconscious;   productive;   the  puruṣa   is  the opposite  of them, although  similar (to the avyakta as characterized in vs.X.).

 29. Johnston,  Early,  p.71.  This is not to  say, though, that  the  Sāṃkhyakārikā  belief  in the guṇa-s'  functions  is in  any  way  a response  to Aśvaghoṣa.

 30. Johnston, Early, p.69. Compare B,p. lvii, how-

 31. Larson,Classical Sāṃkhya, pp.113, 174; J.A.B. van Buitenen.  "Studies  in Samkhya, II," Journal of the American Oriental Society 77 (1957): 22-23;  see SK XXV.

 32. Johnston, B,p. lviii. He cites the meanings  of guṇa  in  the  epic  verses  as:  (a)  " 'quality' generally,"  (b)  "objects  of  the  senses, "  (c) "anything  evolved, which is described as a guṇa of that from which it is evolved," (d)" qualities which serve  to distinguish  the  varieties  of the  three guṇas of prakṛti";  and (e) "the guṇas themselves " [as they are known in the classical scheme].

 33. Johnston, B lvii. Johnston's interpretation of the early Sāṃkhya guṇa-s in the Mahābhārata  as having solely moral functions  is challenged  by Van Buitenen, who claims  instead  that the guṇa-s  had cosmic,   evolutionary   meaning.    See   J.A.B.van Buitenen, "Studies  in  Samkhya, I"  Journal  of the American  Oriental  Society  76(1956): 153, 155-156. Larson,   however,   correctly    synthesizes    van Buitenen's and Johnston's views (see pp.116-120). We can still accept, therefore, Johnston's  discussion, at least as it applies to the Buddhacarita.

 34. Johnston, B, p.lix.

 35. Although  Aśvaghoṣa never mentions the three roots  of good per se, Johnston  infers  term from B ii, 56; xii, 68; and S, v.  17, where hetu works for good and not evil. See Johnston, B,p.xlii.

 36. On this parallel,see Johnston,Early, pp.36-37. Edgerton,   in   his   Buddhist    Hybrid   Sanskrit Dictionary, cites  (s.v.) one  of the  Akuśalamūla slightly  differently  from  Johnston;   'replacing' rāga  with its synonym, lobha (desire, longing  for greed) .  Consequently,  the  three  roots  of  good (kuśalamula) that Edgerton  cites (s.v.) are alobha (non-desire) ,  adveṣa   (non-enmity) ,  and  amoha (non-delusion  of  mind,  non-ignorance) .  Franklin Edgerton,  Buddhist   Hybrid  Sanskrit  Grammar  and Dictionary, 2  vols.  (1953, reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,  1970).  On  the  relationship  between rajas and rāga see J.A. B.van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāṃkhya, III," Journal  of the  American  Oriental Society 77(1957): 93.

 37. Johnston, B, pp.101-102, n. 53. On the concept of rajas  and tamas as a collective  entity, see van Buitenen, "Studies in Samkhya, III," p.100.

 38. Johnston, B, pp. xli-xlii.

 39. Johnston points out that "within the Sāṃkhya range  of  ideas, "  the  meaning   of  moha  "bears resemblance  to the  delusion  of puruṣa, by which, when in contact  with prakṛti, imagines, though  it is really  a separate  entity, it is identical  with it." "Some  Sāṃkhya  and Yoga  Conceptions  of the śvetāśvatara  Upaniṣad," Journal  of  the  Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland (1930): 860.

 40. Johnston, B, p.xlii.He claims that this is not true in the later Abhidharma.  For Nikāya  examples of the calming or suppressing  of one's lower nature or  passions,  and  the  refinement  of  one's  good nature, see Saṃyutta Nikāya 1,5,8; xlvii, III, ii, V; XLVII, III, v, vii, and so on.

 41. Johnston, B, pp.xlii-xliii. For the choice  of the meditational subject best designed to overcome a person's most active evil, see S, xvi, 53-67.

 42. See Early,pp.35-36. On the complementary roles of Sāṃkhya  and Yoga in the Mahābhārata  and the Bhagavadgītā, see Edgerton, Beginnings, p.38;  and "Meaning."  On the  opposition  between  sattva  and rāga, see B vii 53.  For a discussion on the belief that  the purification  of sattva  is tantamount  to release, see  van  Buitenen, "Studies  in Sāṃkhya, III," pp. 98-99.

[Ассаджи]

 43. This argument could not have been used against Īśvarakṛṣṇa's    Sāṃkhya,   however,   since "neither  sattva  as an  independent  principle  nor sattva  as  emancipation   for  the  individual  are doctrines  held  by  classical  Sāṃkhya.   We  can conjecture  that,  with  the  radical  otherness  of puruṣa in Īśvarakṛṣṇa's  atheistic  work, sattva could at best  play  only  a major  role  in the  process  of emancipation, but could not be emancipation  itself. The necessary adjustment is made by making the means of  emancipation  be  an  acquisition  of  knowledge through a bhāva composed of sattva; ie., the bhāva jñāna..., while still insisting  that emancipation lie beyond  anything  to be found in prakṛti, where sattva  and  the  other  guṇa-s  existed."  Stephen A.Kent,  "Valentinian   Gnosticism   and   Classical Sāṃkhya: A Thematic  and  Structural  Study"  (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University  of  Michigan  Microfilm service, 1978), p.43  (M.A.thesis).  On the role  of sattva in classical Sāṃkhya's  liberation  scheme, see Stephen  A.  Kent, "Valentinian  Gnosticism  and Classical   Sāṃkhya:  A  Thematic  and  Structural Comparison," Philosophy East and West 30,no.2(April, 1980):251-252.

  44. Johnston, B, pp. xli-xliii; see Potter,Presup-
positions, pp.102,103,112-113.
  45. Johnston, Early, p.21.
  46. ibid.
  47. See Johnston, B, p.170,n.24.
  48. On Arāda's equating the fivefold ignorance to the  five doṣa-s (faults) , see Johnston, B, p.172, n.34; Johnston, "Some," pp.862,873; compare YS ii.3.
  49. See Johnston, B, p.lx.

  50. Larson,p.111. For a valuable discussion of the rajas-ic and tamas-ic  elements  within the fivefold ignorance and the relationship  between the fivefold ignorance  and  the  rajas/tamas  grouping, see  van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāṃkhya, III," pp.100-101.

  51. See Johnston, Early, p.35.

  52. Johnson,B,p.lviii.The use of the term"prakṛti" in classical  Sāṃkhya  can be confusing, since  it often  appears  as the general  title  for 'matter'. When  the creation  process  is in progree, however, 'prakṛti' means but the 'starting point' from which the guṇa-s  activate, and it is in this sense  that the term is used here.

  53. Johnston, Early, pp.69,71-72. On p.72  he also states  that  Arāḍa's   Sāṃkhya   is  the  final developmental stage before the important association of avyakta with prakṛti (for example, the classical notion) was  made.  Furthermore, he  says  that  the svabhāva  theory  could  only  have  been  held  by anīśvara  (atheistic) Sāṃkhya  schools  that did not accept an Īśvara  as being the creative  force of the world. In theistic, Īśvara systems, such as the Śvet. U., "the Īśvara himself has the function of creation  and  the necessity  for a principle  of svabhāva, separate  from prakṛti and setting it in motion  does  not arise, and accordingly  the use of the term in such systems is not frequent."

  54. SK LV: "the puruṣa,which is conscious, attains there the suffering  made by decay and death;  until deliverance of the subtle body; therefore, suffering is of the nature  of things  (svabhāva)." Johnston, in contrast, claims  that  the (apparent?) connection between puruṣa and the manifest  world is explained in the Yoga Sutras as being accidental (naimittika). See   Johnson,  B,  p.lx;   and   Vācaspatimiśra's explanation of YS.  II.17 in Woods, The Yoga System, p.142.

  55. Bix. 59-62 only mentions the elements fire and water, but the process  by which  they  coalesce  is still clear. In Early, p.67, Johnston identifies the group  holding   this  materialistic   view  as  the bhūtacintakas  of the Mahābhārata (12.224.50, see 12.229.2ff)  and  who  are  better   known   as  the Kvabhāvavādins.

  56. Johnston, Early, p.67. On p.69  he also claims that the classical  guṇapariṇāma  theory might be borrowed"from   the  Yoga  form  of  Sāṃkhya, "  a reference to the Bhāṣya on YS iii.13(in Woods, The Yoga System, p.213).

  57. Johnston, Early, p.60, see  p.72; B, p.lix-lx. Also see van Buitenen, "Studies  in Sāṃkhya, III," pp.100-102,106.

  58. Johnston, Early, p.83, For a brief history  of the  development  of the jīva  ātman  concept, see Kent, Valentinian..ṣtudy, pp.34-37, 53-55.  Another probable function of ahaṃkāra  was to generate the bhūta-s;  see van Buitenen, "Studies  in Sāṃkhya, ii," p.23.

  59. Also see B ix., 64, which is a description  of the Sāṃkhya doctrine: "there are others who assert that the coming into being and the passing away from being is solely on account of the soul."

  60. See Kent, Valentinian..ṣtudy, pp.34-37.
  61. Or so claims Johnston, B,p.lvii.

  62. Ibid.,  p.169, n.21. Concerning  the place  of Kapila  and āsuri within the Sāṃkhya  system, see Larson, Classical Sāṃkhya, p.149 and SK LXIX-LXX.

  63. More  precisely,  Prajāpati  symbolizes " the bhūtāman, here taken as equivalent ot ahaṃkāra." Johnston, B,p.169,n.21.For  the  five  Mahābhārata references  equating Prajāpati with ahaṃkāra, see Johnston, Early, p.17.

  64. Johnston, B,p.170,n.21. Although the emanation process   is  unclear,  one  wonders   whether   the reference to Prajāpati and his sons should be taken as an indication that the five elements generate out of ahaṃkāra.  Johnston, "Some," p.864 claims  that this was the common emanation  pattern  found in the Mahābhārata, as mentioned above in n.23.

  65. Johnston, B,p.lxi. See also YS iii.26, and the accompanying Comments and Explanations.

  66. Johnston, "Some," p.869.

  67. Ibid. Johnston  even  claims  that  "spiritual functions" can also evolve from them.  I do not know what  he means  by this, since, as I see it, all  of the secondary  tattva-s are material  in nature.  In some way, however, Johnston's  claim  may be related to the Yoga practice of meditation  on the elements. See  Mircea  Eliade, Yoga, Immortality, and Freedom, trans.  Willard R.  Trask, Bollingen  Series 76 (Now York: Pantheon  Books, 1964), p.195;  and Johnston's reference  to "yogic absorption  in the elements" in "Some," p.869.

  68. Johnston claims this in "Some," p.870,although admitting  that the evidence is scany to support it. While never explaining  fully  the process  by which the eightfold  prakṛti, through  svabhāva, creates the secondary  evolutes, he does offer a few remarks concerning  how secondary matter was thought to have related to the elements: " Originally each member of the   [śabda]   group   was   considered   a  guṇa [attribute]  of one of the elements  only... but  the later theory... gives  one element  the qualities  of all five, the next  four, and  so on to the last  of one only." Ibid.,pp. 867-868.

  69. Johnston, "Some," p.870.

  70. Ibid.,p.867. The relationship between the five elements, the objects  of the senses  and the senses is very unclear.

  71. See, for instance, Karl H.Potter, ed.,Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies: Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṇgeśa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), pp. 86-87;  112-119; 161-162; Erich Frauwallner, History of Indian Philosophy, trans.  Vṃ.  Bedekar 2 vols., (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), 2:14.

  73. I borrow this basic argument from  Frauwallner I, pp.272-274; see also Johnston, "Some," p.871.  

74. On  the intermediary stage  between  Arāḍa's system  and  the  Sāṃkhyakārikā,  in  which  the eightfold  and sixteen-fold  dividision  falls  into disfavor in the Mahābhārata, see Johnston, "Some," pp. 870-871.

  75. Larson, Classical Sāṃkhya p. 205; see Dasgupta, p.251.
  76. See Edgerton, Beginnings, p.41, and n.2.
  77. Sen Gupta, p.121; Larson, Classical Sāṃkhya, p.122.

  78. Johnston, Early, pp. 54-55, based upon Mahābhārata  passages;  accepted  by  Larson,  Classical Sāṃkhya,  p.123.  This  is  confused, though, when Johnston (B,p.lx) says that Aśvaghoṣa  regards the soul "as an individual, not a universal." On the one hand, he fails to specify  whether  he is addressing Aśvaghoṣa's  notion of ātman  or kṣetrajña.  On the other hand, he fails to clarify what he means by "universal"   (especially   in  relation   to  the Mahābhārata notions of ātman as "cosmic" soul).

  79. See Edgerton, "Meaning," pp.22-29.
  80. Sen Gupta, p.122.
  81. SK LXII: "Nothing, therefore, is bound, othing released,  likewise   not  anything   transmigraces. (Only) prakṛti  in its various forms transmigrates, is bound, and is released."

  82. For  a general discussion  of the Buddhist attempt  to explain  " how bondage  came about and how freedom  is to be gained. " see Potter,  Presuppositions,  pp.113, 131.  In  their  causal  scheme  the Buddhists  avoid postulating  attempt to prevent the problem of subtle but lingering karm-ic seeds.

  83. For a critique concerning the setting forth of Truth or "Knowledge"  within the classical Sāṃkhya scheme,  see  Potter,  Presuppositions,  pp.216-217. Although  it  pertains  to  the  classical   school, Potter's discussion is relevant here.

  84. Commenting on B  xii.79 (p.180), Johnston say, "the argument  apparently  is that the fact that the kṣetrajña  is  called  śarīrin  [having  a body] shows that it did not exist before  there was a body for it to inhabit  (the bond therefore  being anādi [having no beginning, existing from eternity]).

[Ассаджи]

Диаграмма модели ранней Санкхьи для сравнения с моделью обусловленного возникновения
http://dhamma.ru/lib/paticca.htm

http://dhamma.ru/img/sankhya.jpg

[Кусярон]

Здравствуйте,

Однако Ашвагхоша описывает практику очень достоверно.

По каким признакам, и основываюсь на каких фрагментах Вы пришли к такому выводу? Встречали ли такой вывод в исследовательской литературе?

[Ассаджи]

Текст, непосредственно описывающий практику, отличается отсутствием вторичных референтов - не имеющих непосредственного смысла абстракций.

В первоисточнике по практике все описываемые элементы можно различить в опыте, а описание не обладает логической завершенностью.

И главный критерий, конечно, непосредственное применение.

Ашвагхоша, как известно, был буддистом, и хорошо разбирался в практике, в чем можно убедиться по его работе "Саундара-Нанда".
Там он подробно приводит описание практик, даже жертвуя ради этого художественной стороной произведения. По сути в этом произведении пропагандируется буддийская практика. Создается такое впечатление, что он много общался с монахами того времени.

С другой стороны, о достоверности свидетельствуют параллели с другими ранними текстами по практике.

Я приводил в этой теме англоязычные исследования на тему ранней Санкхьи в "Буддачарите".

Из российских исследователей подробно об историчности этого текста пишет Шохин:

То обстоятельство, что изложение самой "доктрины" Алары у Ашвагхоши не обнаруживает (в отличие от изложения его "практики") прямых соответствий в других буддийских памятниках и что он приписывает ему и те положения, которые известны нам хотя и из доклассической, но все же не столь архаичной санкхьи, какой она только и могла быть в рассматриваемую эпоху, порождает некоторые сомнения в связи с историчностью его изложения в целом. Однако мы располагаем фактами и другого рода, для нас значительно более оптимистичными. Во-первых, конкретные исследования убедительно показывают, что автор "Жизни Будды" весьма нередко пользовался материалом даже тех древних буддийских преданий, которые не дошли до нас и в палийском каноне и достаточно часто "восполняет" последний. Во-вторых, Ашвагхоша, излагая от имени Арады и вполне современную ему санкхью (притом в своеобразном собрании цитируемых здесь ее версий), воспроизводит весьма архаичные ее пласты (отсутствие важнейшего компонента основного предания санкхьи – учения о гунах – см. выше, "индивидуалистическая" в значительной мере трактовка важнейшей категории "непроявленное", имеющего в основной традиции санкхьи космологический характер, способ описания четырех признаков "проявленного" через параметры рождения, возрастания, старения, умирания). Эти "архаизмы" находят соответствия, да и то частичные, лишь в другой древнейшей версии санкхья-йоги – в "Катха-упанишаде", датируемой примерно серединой I тыс. до н.э.

http://psylib.org.ua/books/shohi01/index.htm

[Ассаджи]

Статья со ссылками на эту тему:

А. В. Демченко

О двух способах репрезентации мистического опыта в брахманизме и раннем буддизме