Перевод "phassa"

[ae]

Соприкосновение или касание, ага.

[Ассаджи]

Не ага.

[Ассаджи]

Соприкосновение

Хотя, да.

[Ассаджи]

Как подсказал в разговоре ae, "пхасса" не воспринимается непосредственно.
В суттах говорится об отслеживании возникновения и исчезновения "ведана" - но не "пхасса".

[Bahupada]

На мой взгляд, соприкосновение, "прикосновение" и т.д. - вполне удачны.
Как я понимаю, в понятии "пхасса" терминологически нет того сугубого "психологизма", которое есть, в терминах, производных от корня jña, например, saññā, viññāṇa и т.п. В соответствии с определение phassa в суттах, как о соединении трех составляющих, phassa может мыслиться как свершившееся событие, в котором непосредственно проявляет себя сознание viññāṇa по отношению к предмету/опоре, которое сознается. Таким образом, viññāṇa, вместо того, чтобы просто отвлеченно обозначать функцию(возможность/способность) сознавания своего предмета, - в понятии phassa представлено как непосредственно данное осуществление сознавательной способности, то есть способности сознавать свой предмет.

В общем, в понятии phassa возможность предметного сознавания представлена как свершившееся событие в соответствующих сферах - зрения, слуха и т.д. (cakkhu-samphassa, sota-samphassa) и т.д.
В каком-то смысле, пхасса - это даже мера времени, доказательство того, что что-то вообще происходит, а не просто может произойти.

[Ассаджи]

В Абхидхарма-самуччае приводятся созвучные палийским определения терминов.

sparśaḥ katamaḥ / trikasakṣipāte indriyavipāraparicchedaḥ / vedanāsanniśrayadāna karmakaḥ //

What is contact (sparśa)? It is similar to the transformation of a faculty when the threefold union takes place. Its function consists of giving a basis to feeling (vedanā).

http://gretil.sub.uni-goettingen.de/gretil/1_sanskr/6_sastra/3_phil/buddh/asabhs_u.htm
https://books.google.com/books?id=Rr0qDAAAQBAJ&pg=PA9

[Ассаджи]

Sue Hamilton

Identity and Experience

Phassa

In the Majhima Nikāya passage which describes the arising of, say, visual feeling (and the form of the Pali is the same for all six senses), phassa is said to be the combination of three things: eye, (visible) object and consciousness. This is what I have suggested should be understood as the conscious (visual) sensory event. And it is from this conscious sensory event that feeling arises. Elsewhere the way in which phassa gives rise to agreeable, disagreeable or neutral feeling is described by means of analogy. So of agreeable feeling we read that just as when two sticks come into contact together (i.e. when there is friction between them), warmth and heat are produced, but when the two sticks are separated and kept apart, the warmth and heat dissipate and are no longer produced, in just this way agreeable feelings arise because of the appropriate phassa and do not arise when the appropriate phassa ceases. There is no suggestion in the text that this description refers exclusively to bodily (tactile) feelings, and the reference to contact as tactile has to be understood as meaning the coming together of any of the senses and a corresponding object. This point is stressed by the commentator on the Brahmajāla Sutta who states that sense and object are not to be thought of as literally touching one another: rather, phassa is what occurs when there is the appropriate coming together of the two (and viññāṇa). A further point about the analogy of the sticks is that it raises the possibility that phassa itself is agreeable, disagreeable or indifferent. That appropriate feelings arise from appropriate contact suggests that, say, the agreeableness of the feeling is determined at the phassa stage of the process of the arising of the feeling.

As we shall see in chapter III, the passage from which I have quoted a description of the arising of feeling states that as the process continues apperception and identification of the experience in question take place. I have also suggested, partly in the light of this passage but also in the light of others (which are discussed fully in chapter V) that vedanā is not to be understood as mere feeling but that it is part of the cognitive process as a whole. It follows from this suggestion that phassa is also a sine qua non of the cognitive process as a whole. That this is the case is explicitly supported by some canonical passages in which phassa is found. In the Brahmājāla Sutta, in which the Buddha systematically refutes a wide variety of views held by Brahmans and ascetics, phassa is stated to be involved in each and every one of the views referred. Without phassa, the Sutta states, none of those views would be held. All of the views arise because of continual contact in the six spheres of contact. And in the Saṃyutta Nikāya we read that (visual) contact is defined as the meeting, coincidence, coming together of eye, visible object and consciousness. Later the passage states: "Contacted one feels, contacted one thinks, and contacted one apperceives". In a description of the five khandhas in the Khandha Saṃyutta of the Saṃyutta Nikāya we read that it is from the arising of phassa that vedanā, saññā and samkhāra arise, and from its cessation that they cease. In the same passage, rūpa is said to arise and cease according to the arising and cessation of food (āhāra), and viññāṇa arises and ceases according to the arising and cessation of namarūpa. These differences are unsurprising if one remembers that the classification into khandhas is an analysis rather than a prescription for the arising of the human being. What is meant, therefore, is that the body is dependent for its functioning on food; and vedanā, saññā and samkhārā are dependent for their functioning on phassa (which the passage has defined as the conscious sensory event). Viññāṇa is not dependent on phassa since phassa involves viññāṇa. It is, rather, dependent on namarūpa. Nāmarūpa is discussed in chapter VI, when it will become clearer in what sense viññāṇa might be said to be dependent on it.

It appears from what we have seen thus far that it is reasonable to describe phassa, which is defined as the contact which takes place when viññāṇa, sense organ and sense object come together, as a conscious sensory event, as I have suggested.

https://books.google.com/books?id=CDkFAAAAYAAJ&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=Phassa

[Ассаджи]

Хорошие цитаты о соприкосновении как активном (а не пассивном) явлении, из работ досточтимого Леди Саядо:

Phassa means contact, and contact means the faculty of pressing the object (arammana), so as to cause the agreeable or disagreeable sap (so to speak) to come out. So it is the main principle or prime mover of the mental properties in the uprising. If the sap cannot be squeezed out, then all objects (arammana) will be of no use.

Contact (phassa).
Contact is the act of touching. Consciousness cognises each several object. But contact must be distinguished from such a sense-cognition. For contact implies that 'concussion' which alone brings the functional activity of the senses into play. As commonly understood, contact may be a mere physical collision or juxtaposition of two things. But in Abhidhamina (or philosophy) touching denotes only stimulus (sanghattana). Otherwise, all material things would be called tangible objects. But the force of the term 'stimulus' is that there must be union, meeting, acting'together of all things connected with the stimulation. It is by reason of this acting together that various sense-operations take place. In the Pali we are told: 'Due to contact, and conditioned by contact, feeling, perception, and active complexes are manifested. (Samyutta-Nikaya, iii, 101 f.)

Contact is regarded also as one among the four kinds of nutrition. Taken in this sense, contact is of six kinds: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile and mental.
But how is it that because of the six sense-spheres contact comes to be? In the Pali we read: 'Because of the eye (organ of vision), visual cognition arises with regard to visual objects. The conjuncture of these three is contact. The same holds true of the other special senses.' This means that based upon the sense-organ, and depending on the sense- impression (nimittam), sense-apprehension comes to pass. This being so, the intensity of impression, in the case of each special sense, varies with the stimulus.

from: Manuals of Buddhism by Ledi Sayadaw
http://www.abhidhamma.com/txt_Manuals_of_Buddhism.pdf