Перевод "vedanā"

Автор Ассаджи, 11:14 18 февраля 2011

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Ассаджи

Для начала диссертация:

Salkin, Sean

A survey of the use of the term vedanā ("sensations") in the Pali Nikayas

http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/2075


Ассаджи

Из "Вопросов Милинды" в переводе Парибка:

Царь молвил: «Почтенный Нагасена, каково свойство ощущения?»— «Свойство ощущения — ощущать и переживать, государь».— «Приведи пример».— «Например, государь, некто попросил у царя должность, расположил царя к себе и получил от него должность. На этой должности он зажил в холе и неге, ублажая все свои пять чувств, и сознавал: ,,Когда-то я попро­сил у царя должность, понравился царю и был пожалован должностью. Вот благодаря этому я и переживаю теперь та­кие [приятные] ощущения". Или иначе, государь: например, некто совершал благие деяния. Тогда после смерти и распада тела он родится в благом уделе, на небесах, заживет там в холе и неге, услаждая божественно все свои пять чувств, и будет сознавать: ,,Когда-то я совершал благие деяния. Вот бла­ годаря этому я и переживаю такие [приятные] ощущения". Вот так, государь, свойство ощущения — ощущать и переживать».— «Прекрасно, почтенный Нагасена».

Ассаджи

Ден Люстхаус пишет:

sparśa (P. phassa) - Literally 'touch' or 'sensory contact'. This term accured varied usages in later Indian thought, but here it simply means that the sense organs are 'in contact with' sensory objects. The circuit of intentionality, or to borrow Merleau-Ponty's term intentional arc, is operational. This term could be translated as 'sensation' as long as this is qualified as a constitutional, active process that is invariably contextualized within its psycho-cognitive dimensions. For Buddhists, sensation can neither be passive nor purely a pysical or neurological matter. When the proper sensorial conditions aggregate, i.e., come into contact with each other, sensation occurs. These proper conditions include a properly functioning sense organ and a cognitive-sensory object, which already presuppose a linguistically-complex conscious body (nāma-rūpa).

vedanā - As in the skandhic model vedanā here means the three initial interpretive modes of any experience, viz. pleasure, pain, and neutral. Every instance of 'contact' is immediately perceived as either pleasure, pain or neutral.

http://books.google.com/books?id=j0TKAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA59&lpg=PA59

Ассаджи

Досточтимый Ньянапоника пишет:

It should be first made clear that, in Buddhist psychology, "feeling" (Pali: vedana) is the bare sensation noted as pleasant, unpleasant (painful) and neutral (indifferent). Hence, it should not be confused with emotion which, though arising from the basic feeling, adds to it likes or dislikes of varying intensity, as well as other thought processes.

...

When emotions follow, they do so in accordance with the next link of Dependent Origination: "Feeling conditions Craving" (vedana-paccaya tanha).

The feeling that arises from contact with visual forms, sounds, odors, and tastes is always a neutral feeling. Pleasant or unpleasant feelings do not always follow in relation to these four sense perceptions; but when they follow, they are then an additional stage of the perceptual process, subsequent to the neutral feeling which is the first response.

But bodily impressions (touch, pressure, etc.) can cause either pleasant or unpleasant feelings.

Mental impressions can cause gladness, sadness or neutral (indifferent) feeling.

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/nyanaponika/wheel303.html

Since feeling, in its primary state, simply registers the impact of the object, in itself it is quite devoid of any emotional bias. Only when volitional evaluations are admitted will there appear emotions such as desire and love, aversion and hate, anxiety and fear, as well as distorting views. But these admixtures need not arise, as the emotions are not inseparable parts of the respective feelings. In fact, many of the weaker impressions we receive during the day stop at the mere registering of a very faint and brief feeling, without any further emotional reaction. This shows that it is psychologically possible to stop at the bare feeling and that this can be done intentionally with the help of mindfulness and self-restraint, even in cases when the stimulus to convert feelings into emotions is strong. Through actual experience it can thus be confirmed that the ever-revolving round of dependent origination can be stopped at the stage of feeling, and that there is no inherent necessity for feeling to be followed by craving. Here we encounter feeling as a key factor on the path of liberation and can see why, in the Buddhist tradition, the contemplation of feeling has always been highly regarded as an effective aid on the path.

http://www.budsas.org/ebud/ebmed061.htm

Ассаджи

#4
Питер Харви пишет:

Vedana or 'feeling'. This is the hedonic tone or 'taste' of any experience: pleasant, painful (dukkha) or neutral. It includes both sensations arising from the body and mental feelings of happiness, unhappiness or indifference.

https://books.google.com/books?id=8XAgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA56

Feeling (vedana): the pleasant, unpleasant and neutral feeling-tones that arise, whether from body or mind, or from ordinary wordly causes or spiritual ones, such as the joy that may arise in meditation.

https://books.google.com/books?id=8XAgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA324

vedanā: 'feeling', the hedonic tone of any experience, its aspect as being pleasant, unpleasant or neutral.

https://books.google.com/books?id=1azdAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA4

Ассаджи

Думаю, лучший перевод на русский "ощущение". Как показывает опыт, при переводе "чувство" читатели склонны понимать это слово в смысле:

3. Эмоциональные состояния, такие как чувство благополучия, чувство депрессии, чувство желания и т.д.

Трудность, связанная с этим термином, состоит в том, что его использование почти всегда метафорично, и так или иначе все мы, кажется, совершенно убеждены, что знаем, что мы имеем в виду, когда употребляем его.

http://psychology_dictionary.academic.ru/9277/%D0%A7%D0%A3%D0%92%D0%A1%D0%A2%D0%92%D0%9E

LXNDR

#6
Цитата: Ассаджи от 08:05 02 февраля 2015
Думаю, лучший перевод на русский "ощущение". Как показывает опыт, при переводе "чувство" читатели склонны понимать это слово в смысле:

в то же время например в Саккапаньха сутте (ДН 21)

раздел об эмоциях (соманасса/доманасса/упеккха) называется Vedanā­kam­maṭṭhāna

ведана бывает кайика (телесная) и четасика (ментальная). три вида ментальной веданы называются соманасса, доманасса и упеккха, а это как раз эмоциональные состояния.

по-русски сенсорные органы, получающие ощущения извне, мы называем органами чувств

для названия процесса восприятия как ощущений, так и эмоций, мы используем одно и то же слово чувствовать - чувствовать боль и чувствовать страх, либо испытывать

иногда процес восприятия эмоциональных состояний называют глаголом ощущать, но звучит он несколько стилистически сниженно по сравнению с чувствовать и используется реже

на украинском відчуття и почуття  - однокоренные слова

похоже, что слово чувство охватывает более широкий спектр психических процессов, соответствующих понятию ведана

Bahupada


Ассаджи

Цитата: LXNDR от 22:09 16 июля 2015
раздел об эмоциях (соманасса/доманасса/упеккха) называется Vedanā­kam­maṭṭhāna

ведана бывает кайика (телесная) и четасика (ментальная). три вида ментальной веданы называются соманасса, доманасса и упеккха, а это как раз эмоциональные состояния.

Есть небольшое пересечение сфер явлений, обозначенных этими словами.
Отдельные виды "ведана" можно в принципе отнести к русским "эмоциям".

Основные же эмоции:

    радость (довольство)
    удивление
    печаль (грусть)
    гнев (злость)
    отвращение
    презрение
    страх

никак не относятся к "ведана" ни в Сутте, ни в Абхидхамме.

Цитироватьпохоже, что слово чувство охватывает более широкий спектр психических процессов, соответствующих понятию ведана

В том-то и дело, что это слово настолько многозначное, что может вводить в заблуждение.
В основном "чувствами" называют эмоции, - а они никак не соответствуют "ведана".

LXNDR

Цитата: Ассаджи от 14:24 08 ноября 2015

Основные же эмоции:

    радость (довольство)
    удивление
    печаль (грусть)
    гнев (злость)
    отвращение
    презрение
    страх

никак не относятся к "ведана" ни в Сутте, ни в Абхидхамме.

ну как же?

Цитировать
assutavā, bhikkhave, puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati. So dve vedanā vedayati—kāyikañca, cetasikañca. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, purisaṃ sallena vijjheyya. Tamenaṃ dutiyena sallena anuvedhaṃ vijjheyya. Evañhi so, bhikkhave, puriso dvisallena vedanaṃ vedayati. Evameva kho, bhikkhave, assutavā puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati. So dve vedanā vedayati—kāyikañca, cetasikañca.

uninstructed worldling is being contacted by a painful feeling, he sorrows, grieves, and laments; he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught. He feels two feelings—a bodily one and a mental one. Suppose they were to strike a man with a dart, and then they would strike him immediately afterwards with a second dart, so that the man would feel a feeling caused by two darts. So too, when the uninstructed worldling is being contacted by a painful feeling ... he feels two feelings—a bodily one and a mental one.

https://suttacentral.net/en/sn36.6

таким образом как минимум печаль/досада/сожаление/грусть определены как ментальное четасика (болезненное) чувство ведана

печаль/досада/сожаление/грусть суть эмоции, поэтому четасика ведана - это эмоции

если четасика ведана это не эмоция, то что это?

насколько я понимаю в Суттанте дана просто общая классификация эмоций (ментальных чувств), по трём типам: приятные (соманасса), неприятные (доманасса) и нейтральные (упеккха), в которые вписывается всё многообразие конкретных эмоций

Ассаджи

Цитата: LXNDR от 17:19 08 ноября 2015
assutavā, bhikkhave, puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati. So dve vedanā vedayati—kāyikañca, cetasikañca. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, purisaṃ sallena vijjheyya. Tamenaṃ dutiyena sallena anuvedhaṃ vijjheyya. Evañhi so, bhikkhave, puriso dvisallena vedanaṃ vedayati. Evameva kho, bhikkhave, assutavā puthujjano dukkhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno socati kilamati paridevati urattāḷiṃ kandati sammohaṃ āpajjati. So dve vedanā vedayati—kāyikañca, cetasikañca.

uninstructed worldling is being contacted by a painful feeling, he sorrows, grieves, and laments; he weeps beating his breast and becomes distraught. He feels two feelings—a bodily one and a mental one. Suppose they were to strike a man with a dart, and then they would strike him immediately afterwards with a second dart, so that the man would feel a feeling caused by two darts. So too, when the uninstructed worldling is being contacted by a painful feeling ... he feels two feelings—a bodily one and a mental one.

https://suttacentral.net/en/sn36.6

таким образом как минимум печаль/досада/сожаление/грусть определены как ментальное четасика (болезненное) чувство ведана

Где же именно они так определены? С таким же успехом ведь и удары себе по груди можно отнести к "ведана" рассудочного происхождения.

Цитироватьесли четасика ведана это не эмоция, то что это?

Это понятие, которому нет точного соответствия в русском языке. Однако благодаря тому, что это явление можно отследить в опыте, можно подобрать ему более-менее подходящее русское соответствие.

Юджин Джендлин, исследуя происходящее в опыте, назвал такое явление "felt sense".

По моему опыту, это скорее ощущение, и никак не эмоция. И явление это, на бытовом уровне, довольно простое.

Вот, скажем, когда смотришь на старую фотографию, то порой могут всплыть яркие воспоминания, - вплоть до шума волн или лучистого воздуха. Рассудок (мано) при этом дополняет увиденное, порождая соответствующие ощущения (а также последующие распознавания, побуждения, мысли, эмоции, желания и т.п.).

Аналогично, в случае физической боли, при неосновательном внимании, рассудок может ассоциативно дополнять теперешнюю боль запомненной ранее болью. Физическое соприкосновение (пхасса) в данный момент дополняется соприкосновением рассудочного происхождения. Это происходит из-за жажды, которая вызывает, как один из видов подпитки (ахара), соприкосновение (пхасса).

"Bhikkhus, these are the four finds of supports for the maintenance of beings that have arisen and as help for those seeking birth. What four? First is material food, coarse or fine; the second is contact; mental volition is the third and consciousness is the fourth.

"Bhikkhus, from what do these four supports originate, rise, take birth and develop?

"These four supports originate, rise, take birth and develop from craving."

http://leighb.com/mn38.htm
http://dhamma.ru/lib/paticca.htm

Цитироватьнасколько я понимаю в Суттанте дана просто общая классификация эмоций (ментальных чувств), по трём типам: приятные (соманасса), неприятные (доманасса) и нейтральные (упеккха), в которые вписывается всё многообразие конкретных эмоций

В Суттанте приведено несколько классификаций "ведана". Одна из них - классификация по трем типам (приятные, мучительные и ни-приятные-ни-мучительные). Есть и другие классификации:

Atthasatapariyaya Sutta: One Hundred Eight Feelings
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn36/sn36.022.nypo.html#feel-36

"Ведана" рассудочного происхождения - явление того же плана, что и "ведана" физического происхождения, в опыте они очень похожи. Это можно сравнить с тем, как человек под гипнозом получает ожог от будто бы раскаленного предмета.

Эмоции (страх, радость и т.п.) - более сложные явления. В Абхидхамме они отнесены к санкхара-кхандхе, а в Сутте никогда не называются "ведана".

Даже в случае "доманасса", которое можно перевести как "уныние", оно никак не приравнивается к "печали" ("сока") как эмоции, и не употребляется рядоположно. Это более элементарное явление, мучительное ощущение, как правило, из памяти. Уже на его основе могут возникать разнообразные эмоции, - от злости и страха до печали и отвращения, и соответствующие действия.

Предвкушение или воспоминание как источники "ведана" описаны в Салаятана-вибханга сутте:

"And what are the six kinds of household joy (somanassa)? The joy that arises when one regards as an acquisition the acquisition of forms cognizable by the eye — agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, connected with worldly baits — or when one recalls the previous acquisition of such forms after they have passed, ceased, & changed: That is called household joy. (Similarly with sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations, & ideas.)

"And what are the six kinds of household distress (domanassa)? The distress that arises when one regards as a non-acquisition the non-acquisition of forms cognizable by the eye — agreeable, pleasing, charming, endearing, connected with worldly baits — or when one recalls the previous non-acquisition of such forms after they have passed, ceased, & changed: That is called household distress. (Similarly with sounds, smells, tastes, tactile sensations, & ideas.)

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.137.than.html

Есть, конечно, и ощущения рассудочного происхождения, которые испытываются в джханах и при Освобождении, как описывается в той же сутте. Но их уже сложнее обсуждать.

LXNDR

Цитата: Ассаджи от 19:10 08 ноября 2015
Эмоции (страх, радость и т.п.) - более сложные явления. В Абхидхамме они отнесены к санкхара-кхандхе, а в Сутте никогда не называются "ведана".

а как они называются в Сутте?


Ассаджи

Бхиккху Бодхи пишет:

"Feeling (vedanā): Feeling is the mental factor which feels the object. It is the effective mode in which the object is experienced. The Pali word vedanā does not signify emotion (which appears to be a complex phenomenon involving a variety of concomitant mental factors), but the bare affective quality of an experience, which may be either pleasant, painful or neutral."

A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma: The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Ācariya Anuruddha
https://books.google.com/books?id=dYSsAAAAQBAJ&pg=PA80

Ассаджи

Досточтимый Аналайо пишет:

7. Feeling / Vedanā

"Feeling" or "sensation", vedanā, is the second of the five aggregates of clinging and the seventh link in the standard depiction of dependent arising, paṭicca samuppāda (the link that leads to the arising of craving). The role of feelings in these two contexts reflects the importance of vedanā in the early Buddhist analysis of reality. In fact, according to a dictum found in several discourses, all phenomena converge on feeling, vedanāsamosaraṇā sabbe dhammā (AN IV 339; AN V 107). Hence an appraisal of feeling and its implications is of considerable importance for an understanding of early Buddhism in general and of the path to liberation in particular.

In the present essay, I will first of all examine the nature of feelings in general (7.1). Next I will turn in some detail to the distinction between bodily and mental types of feelings (7.2), followed by exploring the relation of feelings to karmic retribution (7.3) and to the formation of views (7.4).

7.1 The Nature of Feelings

The term vedanā is derived from the root √vid , whose range of meaning covers both "to feel" and "to know". Vedanā can thus be understood to represent the affective aspect of the process of knowing, the `how' of experiencing, so to say. While vedanā has a strong conditioning impact on emotions, vedanā does not include emotion in its range of meanings. In the thought world of the early discourses, the concept of `emotion' would perhaps find its closest Pāli counterpart in citta. In contrast, vedanā simply refers to feelings as one of the building blocks of such complex phenomena as emotions.

As such, vedanā stands in an intimate relationship with the cognitive input provided through "perception", saññā, since what one feels, one perceives, yaṁ vedeti taṁ sañjānāti (MN I 293). According to the standard definition given in the discourses, feeling 'feels', in the sense that it feels such affective tones as pleasure, displeasure and hedonic neutrality, sukha, dukkha, adukkhamasukha (SN III 86).

The basic distinction between pleasant, unpleasant and neutral feelings can be expanded further by combining this triad with each of the six senses, by distinguishing between feelings that are related to the household life and those that are related to renunciation, and by taking into account if feelings manifest in the past, present or future. In this way, we arrive at a total count of one-hundred-and-eight types of feelings (SN IV 232). Such different modes of analysis are, however, merely complementary perspectives on the phenomenon feeling, and none of them should be grasped dogmatically as the only right way of considering feelings (MN I 398).

In addition to analysing feelings into different types, the discourses illustrate the nature of feeling with a range of similes. One of these similes indicates that the different types of feelings are like winds in the sky, which come from different directions and can at times be dusty, hot or cold, mild or strong (SN IV 218). This imagery illustrates the somewhat accidental character of feelings, whose nature is to manifest in ways that are often out of one's control. The simile of the winds in the sky thus highlights that just as it is meaningless to contend with the vicissitudes of the weather, similarly, the arising of unwanted feelings is best borne with patience.

Another simile compares feelings to various types of visitors that come to a guesthouse from any of the four directions (SN IV 219). Feelings are similar to such visitors, they come and go, hence no need to become agitated and obsessed with the particular feeling that might have manifested at present, as soon enough this internal `visitor' will go as well.

The ephemeral nature of feelings, already alluded to in the image of visitors that come and go, becomes more prominent in another simile that compares feelings to bubbles on the surface of water during rain (SN III 141). On investigating this matter, an onlooker would soon come to the conclusion that these bubbles are insubstantial and without any essence. Feelings, in whatever way they appear, are similarly in substantial and without any essence. Just like a bubble, they will manifest only to disappear right away, thereby revealing their utterly ephemeral and insubstantial nature.

The insubstantial nature of feelings comes up again in another simile, which compares grasping feeling as a self or as belonging to a self to a man who is carried along by a mountain river and tries to grasp the grass that grows on the river bank. The grass will tear off and break due to his grasping, and the man will be unable to extricate himself from the current of the river in this way (SN III 137).

Insubstantial and void as they are, feelings are simply the product of conditions (SN II 38). Several similes highlight how feeling depends on contact. The affective tone of feeling is the product of the type of contact on which it is based, comparable to heat that is produced when two fire-sticks are rubbed against each other (SN IV 215). Once the two fire-sticks are separated the heat ceases, just as when contact ceases, the respective feeling will also cease. 

Again, the radiance of a lamp is the product of oil, wick and flame. Due to the impermanent nature of these three, the radiance has to be impermanent as well. In the same way, feelings are the product of contact through any of the six sense-doors, therefore they must be as impermanent as the sense- doors themselves (MN III 273). Or else, the shadow of a tree is the product of the root, the trunk, the branches and the foliage of the tree. Given that these are impermanent, the shadow necessarily must be impermanent. The same applies to fee lings, which are the product of contacting the objects of the senses and thus share their impermanent nature (MN III 274).

Painful feelings in particular are comparable to a bottomless abyss, an abyss deeper than the unfathomable depth of the ocean. The reason for this is that worldlings react to painful feelings with sorrow and lamentation, thereby perpetual ting their experience of suffering (SN IV 206).

The Salla-sutta explains that by reacting with aversion to painful feelings, a worldling is as if shot by two arrows: in addition to the bodily experience of pain, the arising of aversion causes the affliction of mental agony and distress (SN IV 208). Being thus immersed in bodily and mental pain, the worldling knows no other way out but to search for some form of sensual pleasure as an escape from the painful experience.

The experience of pain leads to ever greater bondage if one gives fuel to the underlying tendency to aversion when reacting to pain, to the underlying tendency to passion through yearning for sensual pleasure, and to the underlying tendency to ignorance due to not attending to the true nature of feelings.

In contrast to this predicament, the noble disciple does not react to pain but simply bears it with composure. For this reason, only a single arrow afflicts him or her, and a version to the pain will not arise, nor yearning for sensual pleasures as a way to escape from pain. In this way, the experience of painful feelings leads to insight and the bondage to feelings d diminishes.

7.2 Bodily and Mental Feelings

In addition to providing this instructive imagery on how to handle pain, the Salla-sutta's distinction between being afflicted merely by the single arrow of bodily feelings and being the victim of the additional arrow of mental feelings is of relevance to an understanding of the distinction between bodily and mental feelings in general.

The notion of `bodily feelings' may at first seem puzzling, since feelings are by definition mental and related to the mind, cetasikā dhammā, cittapaṭibaddhā (MN I 301). For this reason, feelings are part of "name", nāma, in the context of an exposition of name-and-form, nāma-rūpa (MN I 53).

Therefore, to speak of a `bodily feeling' must refer to the source from which such feeling has arisen, namely the body, not to the nature of the feeling itself, which by definition has to be a mental phenomenon. This much would follow from the exposition in the Salla-sutta , whose purpose is to clarify that, in addition to the painful feelings that may arise due to bodily affliction, the second dart of affliction manifests due to feelings that originate because of the mental reaction to bodily pain.

The distinction between bodily and mental feelings is thus a mode of analysis that aims at the sense-door based on which feeling arises. The same mode of analysis may alter natively take into account all sense-doors and distinguish feelings into six types, covering those that arise based on contact by way of the eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the body an d the mind (SN III 60).

Yet, does this mean that the experience of feelings is entirely mental and bears no relation to the body? This does not seem to be the case. In fact, common experience indicates that the actual experience of pleasant or painful feeling involves the body as well as the mind. Joy may manifest as raising of the hair and goose pimples, just as displeasure may show its effects through bodily tension and facial expression. Again, obtaining or losing desirable objects can affect the heart beat and blood circulation, or else intense feelings can cause faster breathing, etc.

In the listing of the five aggregates, feelings are placed right after the body and before the other mental aggregates. This positioning may well reflect the intermediate role that feelings have within the context of subjective experience. Due to whatever sense-door a pleasant or painful feeling may have arisen, its actual experience will affect the body as well as the mind.

Several discourses in fact reveal aspects of the bodily repercussions of feelings. Thus the Kāyagatāsati-sutta depicts how the pleasant feelings of deeper concentration experience stuff use the whole "body", kāya (MN III 92), a description that conveys the sense of one's entire being, body and mind, being immersed in pleasure and bliss.

The effect of painful feeling on the body is reflected in passages that describe the Buddha rebuking a monk. As a result of such a rebuke, the monk sits in dismay with shoulders drooping and his head hanging down (e.g. MN I 132). Clearly here the mental evaluation of the words just heard has caused the arising of feelings that, in addition to being experienced in the mind as dismay and perhaps shame, manifest bodily to such an extent that the whole posture is affected.

Feelings can thus be seen as an intermediary between body and mind, having a conditioning effect in both directions. One aspect of this intermediary role is that whatever happens in the body is mentally felt through the medium of feelings, while the other aspect is that the affective tone of mental processes influences the body through the medium of feelings. The actual experience of feeling thus usually involves body and mind. An exception is the attainment of the immaterial spheres, where the bodily component of feeling disappears. With such types of experience the affective variety of feeling similarly disappears, as during these attainments − or else when reborn in the corresponding realms − only neutral feelings are experienced. In the normal living situation of the average human being, however, the experience of feeling involves the body as well as the mind.

In the language of the early discourses, the bodily and mental aspect of feelings are often considered together, such as when sukha or dukkha vedanā are defined as comprising bodily as well as mentally felt experience, yaṁ kāyikaṁ vā cetasikaṁ vā ... vedayitaṁ (MN I 302). In the context of an exposition of experience from the perspective of the five affective faculties, indriya, the terms sukha and dukkha are, however, only used for feelings arisen from the body, kāyasamphassaja. Feelings that originate from the mind, manosamphassaja, are treated under the headings somanassa and domanassa (SN V 209). This mode of presentation dominates the analysis of feelings in the Abhidhamma and the commentaries.

According to an examination of feelings undertaken in the Abhidhammattha-saṅgaha , sukha and dukkha are only experienced in relation to the body sense-door, whereas the other sense-doors of eyes, ears, nose and tongue are invariably associated with neutral feelings, while the mind is associated with somanassa and domanassa type of feelings (Abhidh-s 2). Occurrences of sukha and dukkha in the early discourses, however, often function as umbrella terms for any feeling of the corresponding affective tone and need not stand for feelings arisen from the bodily sense-door alone.

In addition to analysing feelings into bodily and mental types, the discourses also distinguish between worldly and unworldly feelings, sāmisa and nirāmisa (MN I 59). The rationale behind this distinction is to draw attention to the relation of feelings to underlying tendencies, anusaya. Worldly types of feelings tend to activate the underlying tendencies to passion, aversion and ignorance. Unworldly types of feelings, such as the joy or the equanimity of deep concentration, or the sadness of not yet having reached liberation, do not activate these underlying tendencies (MN I 303). A similar perspective underlies the distinction into feelings related to the household life and those that are related to renunciation, gehasita and nekkhammasita (MN III 217).

Another two-fold analysis of feelings distinguishes between feelings with and without affliction, savyābajjha and avyābajjha (MN I 389). This perspective is in particular related to the issue of karma and rebirth, since due to the afflictive nature of one's volitions and deeds, one eventually has to face afflictive feelings as retribution. While rebirth in hell is felt as an entirely painful and unpleasant experience, rebirth in heaven will be felt as entirely pleasant and agreeable (MN I 74). Rebirth as an animal involves mainly painful experiences, whereas with rebirth as a human being pleasantly felt experiences prevail.

https://www.buddhismuskunde.uni-hamburg.de/pdf/5-personen/analayo/from-craving.pdf#page=79

Ассаджи

Падмасири де Сильва пишет:

Pleasant feelings (sukhaa vedanaa) and painful feelings (dukkhaa vedanaa) are affective reactions to sensations. When we make a judgment in terms of hedonic tone of these affective reactions, there are excited in us certain dispositions to possess the object (greed), to destroy it (hatred), to flee from it (fear), to get obsessed and worried over it (anxiety), and so on. Our attitudes which have been formed in the past influence our present reactions to oncoming stimuli, and these attitudes are often rooted in dynamic personality traits. These attitudes, according to Buddha, are not always the result of deliberations at a conscious level, but emerge on deep-rooted proclivities referred to as anusaya. Pleasant feelings induce an attachment to pleasant objects, as they rouse latent sensuous greed (raagaanusaya), painful feelings rouse latent anger and hatred (pa.tighaanusaya). States like pride, jealousy, elation, etc., can also be explained in terms of similar proclivities (anusaya). It is even said that such proclivities as leaning towards pleasurable experience (kaama raagaanusaya) and malevolence (byaapaadaanusaya) are found latent even in "an innocent baby boy lying on his back."

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/desilva-p/wheel237.html

Ассаджи

Цитата: LXNDR от 20:05 08 ноября 2015
Цитата: Ассаджи от 19:10 08 ноября 2015
Эмоции (страх, радость и т.п.) - более сложные явления. В Абхидхамме они отнесены к санкхара-кхандхе, а в Сутте никогда не называются "ведана".

а как они называются в Сутте?

Для них нет особого названия.

LXNDR

спасибо за выдержку из работы Аналайо

всю работу я ещё не читал, но по крайней мере в цитате он не разъясняет что является ментальным чувством

и особенно обескураживает, что этому нет определения и в самих Никаях, что вынуждает строить домыслы об одной из центральных концепций Учения, которая должна была бы быть изложена достаточно однозначно

пока прихожу к выводу, что четасика ведана - это три самые элементарные эмоции: радость, грусть, безразличие

возможно ведана можно перевести как переживание
как и в случае с ведана, употребляя слово переживание мы обычно подразумеваем элементарную классификацию явлений психического и психофизического опыта на приятные/счастливые, неприятные/гнетущие/тягостные и нейтральные/неопределённые

Ассаджи

Цитата: LXNDR от 12:39 10 ноября 2015
что является ментальным чувством

и особенно обескураживает, что этому нет определения и в самих Никаях

Определено главное - что "четасика ведана" попрождаются соприкосновением рассудка (мано).

394.  "Katama~nca,  bhikkhave,  domanassa.m?  Ya.m  kho,  bhikkhave,  cetasika.m  dukkha.m cetasika.m  asaata.m  manosamphassaja.m  dukkha.m asaata.m vedayita.m, ida.m vuccati, bhikkhave, domanassa.m.

http://dhamma.ru/forum/index.php?topic=443.0

Благодаря определению места явлений в "обусловленном возникновении" можно, с помощью интроспекции, узнать, что это такое.

Развитие навыков интроспекции необходимо в силу культурных различий. Скажем, если общаешься с эскимосами, то для того, чтобы понять сорок оттенков белого снега, нужно долго наблюдать эти оттенки. Аналогично, чтобы различить тонкие внутренние явления, которые знали в древней Индии, нужно научиться их отслеживать на собственном опыте.

Что именно имеется в виду, когда говорится, что "ведана" возникает при соприкосновении (пхасса), и исчезает с прекращением соприкосновения? Ответ на этот вопрос можно найти только в собственном опыте.

Наша нынешняя культура ориентирована на технические средства, а в поведении людей различаются лишь наиболее грубые, внешние проявления, - например, те же эмоции.
В древнеиндийской интроспективной культуре различались более тонкие внутренние движения, - например, "сання" (распознавание), предшествующее мысли (см. http://dhamma.ru/lib/paticca.htm ), "ведана" (ощущение), предшествующее эмоции, и т.п.

Именно развитие навыков наблюдения внутреннего мира позволяет перейти от привычного грубого словаря нашей культуры к древнеиндийскому словарю с более тонкими категориями.

Ассаджи

Сивака сутта помогает понять, о чем идет речь:

"Master Gotama, there are some priests & contemplatives who are of this doctrine, this view: Whatever an individual feels — pleasure, pain, neither-pleasure-nor-pain — is entirely caused by what was done before. Now what does Master Gotama say to that?"

[The Buddha:] "There are cases where some feelings arise based on bile. You yourself should know how some feelings arise based on bile. Even the world is agreed on how some feelings arise based on bile. So any priests & contemplatives who are of the doctrine & view that whatever an individual feels — pleasure, pain, neither-pleasure-nor-pain — is entirely caused by what was done before — slip past what they themselves know, slip past what is agreed on by the world. Therefore I say that those priests & contemplatives are wrong."

"There are cases where some feelings arise based on phlegm... based on internal winds... based on a combination of bodily humors... from the change of the seasons... from uneven care of the body... from harsh treatment... from the result of kamma. You yourself should know how some feelings arise from the result of kamma. Even the world is agreed on how some feelings arise from the result of kamma. So any priests & contemplatives who are of the doctrine & view that whatever an individual feels — pleasure, pain, neither pleasure-nor-pain — is entirely caused by what was done before — slip past what they themselves know, slip past what is agreed on by the world. Therefore I say that those priests & contemplatives are wrong."

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn36/sn36.021.than.html

Ассаджи

В Калахавивада сутте из Сутта-нипаты пара "sātaṃ asātaṁ" занимает место "vedanā" в "Обусловленом возникновении":

"Chando nu lokasmiṃ kutonidāno,
Vinicchayā cāpi kutopahūtā;
Kodho mosavajjañca kathaṃkathā ca,
Ye vāpi dhammā samaṇena vuttā".


Question
From what causes in the world is there desire,
and much deliberation on this—whence it comes?
And anger too, false-speaking, also doubtfulness,
and dharmas such as these by the Samaṇa declared

866. – Как зародилась та жажда в мире? И те решения, которые питают желание? Страх, и ошибки, и сомнения? И откуда возникла та Дхарма, которую возвестил нам Пустынник?

"Sātaṃ asātanti yamāhu loke,
Tamūpanissāya pahoti chando;
Rūpesu disvā vibhavaṃ bhavañca,
Vinicchayaṃ kubbati jantu loke.


Buddha
"It's pleasant, unpleasant", so in the world they say
and depending on these arises desire,
but having seen forms, their arising and decay,
then a person in this world certainly deliberates.

867. – Что названо было сладким и горьким, то породило здесь жажду; увидевши разрушение и возникновение в телах, человек составил решения в этом мире;

Kodho mosavajjañca kathaṅkathā ca,
Etepi dhammā dvayameva sante;
Kathaṅkathī ñāṇapathāya sikkhe,
Ñatvā pavuttā samaṇena dhammā".


With anger, false-speaking, also doubtfulness,
and all such dharmas, this quality exists.
The doubting person in the knowledge-path should train
for the Samaṇa has declared dharmas after having Known.

868. страх, сомнения и ошибки – все это связано вместе; пусть сомневающийся потрудится на пути мудрости, приникнет к истинам, возвещенным Пустынником.

"Sātaṃ asātañca kutonidānā,
Kismiṃ asante na bhavanti hete;
Vibhavaṃ bhavañcāpi yametamatthaṃ,
Etaṃ me pabrūhi yatonidānaṃ".


Question
The pleasant, the unpleasant, originate from what?
In the absence of what do these cease to be?
That which is being, non-being as well,
what their origination, do tell me of this?

869. – Откуда идут те сладости и горечи мира, и жаждой чего они возникают? И откуда рождается то понятие "зарождения и разрушения", о котором упомянул ты?

"Phassanidānaṃ sātaṃ asātaṃ,
Phasse asante na bhavanti hete;
Vibhavaṃ bhavañcāpi yametamatthaṃ,
Etaṃ te pabrūmi itonidānaṃ".


Buddha
"Touch", the origination of pleasant, unpleasant,
"Touch" being absent these cease to be.
That which is being, non-being as well,
its origin's thus, I tell you of this.

870. – Сладость и горечь возникают в чувственном контакте, – где нет чувственного контакта, там ни горечи, ни сладости никогда не бывает. Тут же лежит и начало "разрушения и зарождения", о котором упомянул ты, – вот что я говорю.

https://suttacentral.net/en/snp4.11
http://dhamma.ru/canon/kn/snp/sut_nip.htm#_Toc484786553

Ассаджи

#20
Акинчано Вебер обосновывает перевод "feeling tone" ("чувственный тон" или "чувственная окраска") или даже "hedonic tone" ("гедонистическая окраска"):

https://www.akincano.net/PDF/Hedonic_Hotspots-Vedana_Revisited.pdf

Насколько такие переводы уместны и понятны?

Ассаджи

В Комментарии говорится, что "vedanā" возникает одновременно с "phassa":

tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phassoti tesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ saṅgatiyā phasso nāma uppajjati. taṃ phassaṃ paṭicca sahajātādivasena phassapaccayā vedanā uppajjati.

MN-a 1, (paṭhamo bhāgo), 2. sīhanādavaggo, 8. madhupiṇḍikasuttavaṇṇanā, para. 12

Ассаджи

#22
Sue Hamilton

Identity and Experience

Vedanā is sometimes translated as 'sensation' rather than 'feeling', and it could be argued that 'sensation' is a word which is more readily associated with neutrality than is 'feeling', which is more often associated in our minds with pleasure or pain. The word 'sensation' also implies a connection with the senses, which might be said to be more appropriate to vedanā, which requires the coming together of a sense organ and its corresponding sense object in order to arise. But 'feeling' can be used neutrally: it is not uncommon to say 'I feel indifferent about that'. And not only is it commonly accepted that feelings require sensory activity, even if this is not obviously implicit in the word itself, but in the Buddha's analysis of the khandhas this does not only apply to the vedanākhandha but to all four of the arūpakkhandhas. The main reason I prefer the use of the word 'feeling' rather than 'sensation' in translating vedanā is, however, because I suggest that vedanā has a cognitive dimension which is conveyed by the word 'feeling' but not by 'sensation'. The word vedanā comes from root vid, which has a twofold meaning involving both knowledge and (mere) feelings: intellectually it means to know and experientially it means to feel. In vedanā both of these meanings are relevant. Though itself referring only to potential cognitive processes, the wording of the twelvefold paṭiccasamuppāda formula suggests that the purely sensory event takes place when 'contact' occurs. The Pali word for this contact is phassa, and it is from phassa that vedanā then arises, which in turn subsequently gives rise to craving (taṇhā). From this we see that vedanā is more than the (mere) sensory event: it is one stage further on in the process. We have also seen above that feelings are intrinsically pleasant, unpleasant or neutral. This also implies that at the level of the feeling itself there is a degree of discrimination or cognition sufficient for its classification in one of these three ways. A further point arises from the description given above of the arising of feeling, which is that it illustrates that it is part of a process involving both saññā and viññāṇa. We shall see below in the chapters on these two khandhas that both of these are part of the cognitive process. But the saṃkhārakkhandha is not involved. Again as we shall see below (in chapter IV), this is where the emotions Westerners associate with feelings come from.

The cognitive role of vedanā is unsubtle: one might say that it is affective rather than intellectual cognition. It is nevertheless significant enough to be an important factor in understanding the role of the vedanākhandha correctly. From a psychological point of view, it is not too difficult for us to understand that vedanā is part of the cognitive process. We know, for example, that feelings can be expressed cognitively: if we say we are feeling sad, we also mean that we know that we are experiencing sadness. We also commonly refer to feelings as a vague level of knowledge in expressions such as 'I have the feeling that this is correct', or 'I feel there is something wrong here'. Thus vedanā plays a part, however nebulous, in the cognitive process of an individual. It is perhaps significant that vedayita, the (irregular) past passive participle of the verb vedeti, from which vedanā comes, is often interpreted as meaning 'experienced' rather than 'felt'. And 'experience' might be a better translation of vedanā when it is found in the context of the cognitive process as a whole: in English to state that cognition necessarily involves experience is more readily acceptable than stating that it necessarily involves feelings.

https://books.google.com.ua/books?id=CDkFAAAAYAAJ&focus=searchwithinvolume&q=neutrality

Ассаджи

Цитата: Ассаджи от 20:00 02 октября 2019
Акинчано Вебер обосновывает перевод "feeling tone" ("чувственный тон" или "чувственная окраска") или даже "hedonic tone" ("гедонистическая окраска"):

https://www.akincano.net/PDF/Hedonic_Hotspots-Vedana_Revisited.pdf

Насколько такие переводы уместны и понятны?

Что-то я не нахожу убедительных обоснований такой популярной трактовки.